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Abstract 
In this thesis, I discuss my recent compositions from the perspective of contemporary 
strands within philosophical realism. In particular, I focus on the realist theme of the 
autonomous existence of objects, an existence independent of human awareness. I 
propose that while we cannot directly or fully access objects outside human perception, it 
is fruitful to speculate on their autonomous existence, especially within the realm of 
aesthetics. My objective as an artist is to inspire speculation on this autonomous existence
or what I refer to as “objects performing their own existence.” I have attempted to 
accomplish this objective by using common, found, and simple objects and by integrating 
minimal aesthetic cues within an ecological context – one in which objects and spectators 
engage as they normally would outside an institutionalized art context. I begin this 
discourse by laying the theoretical framework for my practice, focusing on certain 
principles of realism. I then survey pieces from other artists that I believe engage these 
realist principles. Lastly, I discuss four of my own compositions in relation to the notion of  
an objects’ autonomy and irreducibility. 
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Definitions  
Is speculating on the “thing-in-itself” worthwhile? 
The underlying principle of philosophical realism is that "the external world exists 
independent of human awareness."1 As philosopher Graham Harman notes, "However 
bland and commonsensical this point may sound, it cuts against the grain of the past 
century of continental philosophy.”2 Far from realism, the past century of continental 
philosophy has instead endorsed the antirealist notion that the world is dependent on the 
human mind.3
Among antirealists there are a range of philosophies that more or less undermine the 
autonomous existence of objects. A philosopher oft-cited as an example of an extreme 
idealist is George Berkeley (1685 -1753) who denies all material existence and claims that 
all objects, from apples to rocks, are only ideas in the minds of perceivers. Reality only 
exists as "an image in some mind, whether it be God's or our own."4 While there are few 
literal followers of Berkeley today, there are more recent strands of idealism that can be 
found in the works of J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), W. J. von Schelling (1775-1854), G. W. F. 
Hegel (1770-1831), and Slavoj Žižek (b. 1949).5 
Graham Harman and Manuel DeLanda also consider Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) to be antirealists, even though these two philosophers and 
their followers "claim to occupy a sophisticated middle ground 'beyond' realism and 
idealism."6 According to this group, the question of whether there exists a world outside of 
our minds is a "pseudoproblem," since mind and world do not exist in isolation from one 
another and, instead, exist as a pair in "mutual correlation."7 This position Quentin 
1. Graham Harman, Object-oriented ontology: A new theory of everything (UK: Penguin, 2018), 10. 
2. Harman, A new theory, 10.
3. Manuel DeLanda and Graham Harman, The rise of realism (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 37.
4. Harman, A new theory, 49.
5. Graham Harman, Speculative Realism: An Introduction (John Wiley & Sons, 2018), 3.
6. Harman, Speculative Realism, 3. 
7. Ibid.
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Meillassoux has attacked and classified as "correlationism," a term later adopted by 
Harman and other realists.8
Regardless of these recent critiques, it is this Husserelian and Heideggerian notion that 
the realism-versus-idealism question is a pseudoproblem, "unworthy of serious 
philosophical attention," that the continental thought continues to "almost unanimously" 
adopt.9 If we trace these lines of thought further in the history of philosophy, we quickly 
approach an even greater philosophical giant, akin to the Beethoven of philosophy, 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). 
According to Kant, the gap between the phenomena of our conscious experience and that 
which exists independent of the mind, known as the noumena or "things-in-themselves," is
"unbridgeable."10 Kant supports this notion by arguing that we cannot make any claims 
about the existence of a thing-in-itself beyond thought, for any claim would itself be a 
thought.11 "Do space and time really exist in themselves? Are they perceived in the same 
way by God, superior alien races, dolphins, crows, bees and amoebas? Or are they 
operative only for finite human beings? Kant thinks there is no way this question can ever 
be answered."12 Given that "things-in-themselves" are, by definition, impossible for the 
human mind to fathom directly, Kant and his followers essentially conclude that "things-in-
themselves" are not worthy of discussion, not even of speculation or imagination. In this 
post-Kantian era, the only thing we are left with is to preoccupy ourselves with the 
phenomenological experience of humans, or said more succinctly, to preoccupy ourselves 
with ourselves. This Kantian ontology still defines the horizon for contemporary philosophy,
but it is important to distinguish the two independent claims that are made: (1) "things-in-
themselves" cannot be directly accessed through human perception, and (2) given the 
inaccessibility of "things-in-themselves," it is not worth speculation.
I agree more or less with the first claim regarding the inaccessibility of things as they exist 
outside human perception. This claim was famously made by Thomas Nagel in “What Is it 
8. Quentin Meillassoux and Alain Badiou, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, London;
New York: Continuum, 2009, 7.
9. Harman, Speculative Realism, 4.
10. Ibid, 81.
11. Ibid.
12. Harman, A new theory, 67-68.
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Like to Be a Bat?” (1974), where he points out that even if we as humans were to try to 
imagine what it is like to be a bat, we would ultimately only get as close as imagining what 
it is like for ourselves to be bats: 
It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which 
enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; 
that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system 
of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging
upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is 
not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat 
behaves.13 
Nagel then proceeds with the claim that even if we could transform into a bat, we would 
still not know what it is like to be a bat because we wouldn't be we anymore, we would 
lose ourselves in the process: 
Even if I could by gradual degrees be transformed into a bat, nothing in my 
present constitution enables me to imagine what the experiences of such a 
future stage of myself thus metamorphosed would be like.14 
Even the contemporary realists who I have been referencing agree that things-in-
themselves are not directly accessible, albeit they don't all agree on the terms for this 
inaccessibility. Harman uses the terms "withdrawal" and "withhold" to describe the 
inaccessibility of "things-in-themselves," what he calls the "real objects." According to his 
notion of withdrawal, "a form can exist in only one place; it cannot be moved into a mind or
anywhere else without being translated into something different from what it was."15  
DeLanda agrees with Harman that objects, including humans, do not have direct access to
each other, instead "only 'sensing' the outer surfaces of other objects.”16 However, 
DeLanda considers Harman's determination that all objects consist of a "real object" 
impossible to access to be unnecessarily establishing fundamental limits of our 
knowledge.  According to DeLanda, the aspects of objects that are possible or impossible 
for us to access can change over time with advances in our cognitive tools. In other words,
the full knowledge of an object is highly unlikely not because of a "fundamental withdrawal 
of the object” but because the "open-ended nature" of the world makes it very unlikely that,
13. Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?," The philosophical review 83, no. 4 (1974): 439.
14. Nagel, “What is it like,” 439.
15. Harman, Speculative Realism, 105-106.
16. DeLanda and Harman, The rise of realism, 101.
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for instance, we will know the entire history of an object, not to mention the limits of our 
perception (we can only see a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, we only hear a 
portion of all frequencies, etc).17
This difference in perspective between Harman and DeLanda represents a common binary
division amongst scholars on the subject of the inaccessibility of "things-in-themselves." 
On one side, there are those, like Harman, who emphasize that there is something 
fundamentally inaccessible about all objects, even human interior objects, such as our own
thoughts. On the other side, there are those, like DeLanda who believe that what is 
inaccessible now could be accessible later through cognitive and technological advances. 
However, both camps generally agree that we humans currently lack direct access to and 
knowledge of objects as they exist outside of human perception (with Harman 
emphasizing that we don't even have direct access to our own thoughts and sensations).
As stated above, I agree with this principle. I do not believe we have direct access to 
objects as they exist outside our perception. However, it is the second claim commonly 
established by antirealists that I do not agree with, namely that the nature of an object's 
existence outside human perception is not worth speculation. This validity of this latter 
claim depends on what type of knowledge and access is desirable. If one intends to only 
gain accurate, literal knowledge on a object as it exists outside of human perception then 
yes, I would agree that it is likely not worth pursuing. For that matter, though, I do not 
believe that any effort that requires exact, one-to-one mapping between an object and its 
characterization is worth pursuing. I would also find it useless, for instance, to translate 
text from one language to another if the only objective is an exact, one-to-one mapping 
between terms, an outcome that is likely impossible. 
The question then becomes, "Is knowledge or at least literal knowledge the only object of 
cognition worth pursuing?" According to Harman, when you are asked what something is, 
you are likely to answer by either saying what the thing is made of or what it does. What is 
a mechanical clock? It is an instrument consisting of gears that move hands around a 
display and that tells you the time. Harman claims that these are the two primary types of 
knowledge we have about objects, neither of which exhaust an account of the object.18  
17. Ibid.
18. Harman, A new theory, 43.
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There isn't a problem with these forms of knowledge per se,  just that "we humans 
sometimes convince ourselves that knowledge is the only kind of cognitive activity worth 
pursuing."19
In this respect, art stands out as an obvious cognitive activity arguably worth pursuing that,
for ages, has not only defied literal translation and accurate knowledge but has embraced 
such ambiguities and inaccuracies that result from the nonliteral. Music psychologist Ian 
Cross supports this point with his conception of music as essentially "polyvalent," prone to 
embodying a multiplicity of meanings, a defining tendency of music that he has termed 
floating intentionality. "Music has transposable meanings, floating intentionality; music and 
language inhabit opposite poles on a continuum of specificity of meaning.” Language, as 
used in daily, pragmatic affairs, is located at the pole of specificity, while music is located at
the opposite pole of ambiguity or multiplicity in meaning.20
José Ortega y Gasset, a philosopher of significant inspiration to Harman, also makes the 
connection between the efficacy and meaning of art and its capacity to transcend the 
literal, knowledge-oriented goals of language. In addition, though, Ortega believes that art 
has the capacity to provide us with a sense of the "thing-in-itself," what he phrases as their
"act of executing themselves" or their "executant reality": 
Now then, imagine the importance of a language or system of expressive signs 
whose function was not to tell us about things but to present them to us in the 
act of executing themselves. Art is just such a language; this is what art does.21 
Ortega later clarifies that art does not actually give us direct access to this "executant 
reality" of objects but that it gives us the impression of such access: 
Notice I am not saying that a work of art reveals the secret of life and being to 
us; what I do say is that a work of art affords the peculiar pleasure we call 
esthetic by making it seem that the inwardness of things, their executant reality, 
is opened to us.22
19. Ibid. 
20. Ian Cross. “Musicality and the Human Capacity for Culture,” Musicae Scientiae 12, no. 1_suppl (March 
2008), 160.
21. Harman, A new theory, 70.
22. Ibid, 81.
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Harman, having integrated much of Ortega's account of aesthetics, calls this special 
capacity of art, "a touching without touching" or an "indirect allusion" to the thing-in-itself.23 
Even with the aid of aesthetics, the thing-in-itself still maintains its inaccessibility. As 
Harman says in reference to the metaphor ‘the cypress is a flame,' "not even the vastest 
army of beautiful metaphors could exhaustively allude to the cypress in its inwardness."24 
This resonates with the Buddhist axiom, "A finger pointing at the moon is not the moon."25 
This saying is a reminder not to confuse the teachings of Buddha with truth itself and to 
remember that the Buddha's teachings are only "a vehicle to describe the truth."26 
Likewise, art can be thought of as a vehicle to describe objects, as the finger pointing 
towards to the moon. The claim that Harman seems to be making, therefore, is that even 
though there is a portion of all objects that are inaccessible, the aesthetic domain, 
nonetheless, can help us point to the real moon, the moon independent of 
phenomenological perception. Moreover, aesthetics is more suited for the task in 
comparison to other domains, such as science, which rely strongly on specificity of 
knowledge, replicability, and verifiability. 
But, wait, are we not just back at where we started? Antirealists often claim that this 
metaphysical realm of things-in-themselves is not worthy of speculation because it will 
never provide any more access to the things-in-themselves than we already have. Here I 
seem to be endorsing the view that even with the imaginative domain of aesthetics it is 
likely that we will not gain anymore access to the autonomous existence of a thing than we
had before. We are still left pointing to the moon. This appears to be a rather weak 
defense. I can imagine a phenomenologist asking the person pointing to the moon, "Why 
are you pointing to the moon, if the only thing you'll ever be able to do is point to the 
moon?" The only appropriate response I can imagine is, "I am pointing to the moon, 
because I'll only ever be able to point to the moon." The idea here being that pointing to 
the moon, in itself, has value. Alluding to the moon - the moon that existed 4.53 billions 
23. Ibid, 82, 63.
24. Ibid, 82.
25. Thich Nhat Hanh, Old Path White Clouds: Walking in the Footsteps of the Buddha, (Sydney, N.S.W.: 
ReadHowYouWant, 2013), 384.
26. Hanh, Old Path White Clouds, 384. 
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years before I was born and will continue to exist after I die - has value, and is better than 
not alluding to it at all. Now, I realize that I have to defend my position. 
First off, I will reiterate a defense for aesthetics as an appropriate domain for investigating 
such ontological inquiries. One may not agree with the worthiness of devoting attention to 
the ontological nature of existence outside of human perception. However, one would be 
hard-pressed to explain why it is not worthy of aesthetic attention. Who can easily defend 
the claim that an artist should not waste their time imagining the incredulous or because 
such speculation will never generate true knowledge? Imagining the unimaginable and 
basking in the ocean of ambiguity, far away from the laboratories of specific knowledge 
and meaning, are the hallmarks of art. Secondly, as an artist, I have personally found 
value in speculating the nature of objects as they exist outside of my awareness. In 
particular, I found that when I create art inspired by this type of speculation, my experience
of the art and the process underlying its creation has fostered in me a deeper engagement
with nonanthropocentrist perspectives. Given the subjectivity of this outcome, I cannot 
claim nonanthropocentrism is a value that anyone can expect to extract from speculation 
on the "thing-in-itself." I make this point primarily to justify my own efforts and time spent 
on the aesthetic experiments I present in this thesis. Moreover, this engagement with 
nonanthropocentrism has served as a guiding principle underlying the criteria I used to 
make fundamental artistic decisions on content and context. Therefore, it is worth 
elaborating on my conception of this principle and how it has motivated my work. 
Nonanthropocentrist Art or Flattened Aesthetics
Anthropocentrism literally means "human-centeredness" and became a key term in the 
emerging environmental ethics movement of the 1970s to denote the belief that humans 
alone possess moral value and that nonhuman entities have value only insofar as they 
serve human interests.27 In colloquial usage, anthropocentrism tends to have a less 
specific yet similar connotation, and is used to refer to the viewpoint that "humans are the 
central or most important entity in the world."28 Conversely, nonanthropocentrism is the 
denial of this belief, arguing that "the non-human world has value in itself" and that we 
27. Trond Gansmo Jakobsen, "Environmental Ethics: Anthropocentrism and Non-Anthropocentrism Revised 
in the Light of Critical Realism," Journal of Critical Realism 16, no. 2 (2017): 184.
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must extend moral standing to nonhuman entities as well, such as (but not exclusively) 
animals, plants and landscapes.29
One of the main objections current realist philosophers have to Kantian and post-Kantian 
philosophy is its almost exclusive attention on the ontology of humans, which they believe 
extends from and perpetuates anthropocentrism. As a result, several new realist 
philosophies have emerged in the past decade as a response against anthropocentrism 
and have focused on developing a philosophy which promotes nonanthropocentric 
thoughts and perspectives. In 2006, DeLanda coined the term 'flat ontology' in his book 
Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy as an anti-reductionist term to mean that objects 
as different as elephants, humans, atoms, and cities may all be equally real.30 Since then, 
flat ontology has been adopted by Harman, claiming to use it in a similar sense as 
DeLanda to refer to an "ontology that initially treats all objects in the same way."31 This is 
not to say that flat ontology claims there are no differences between objects, such as a 
human and a rock, but only that they both equally exist. It appears that in practical usage, 
the term flat ontology is used to argue that nonhuman objects deserve greater ontological 
attention. This is made clear when Harman says,  
If it strikes you as implausible that human beings – however interesting we may 
be to ourselves– deserve to fill up a full half of philosophy, then you are already 
on board with OOO’s critique of modern thought. It is true that humans are a 
remarkable species of living creature....But all these amazing achievements, 
even if we assume that animals cannot do anything nearly as complex, and 
even though we as a species are obviously of special interest to ourselves, do 
not automatically make human beings worthy of filling up fifty per cent of 
ontology.32
This is the basic principle of flat ontology; an ontology becomes flattened when it extends 
past the human realm and spreads its wings to cover a greater diversity of objects. 
Regardless of what appears to be its egalitarian intentions, flat ontology has been met with
28. Sarah E. Boslaugh, “Anthropocentrism,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed December 30, 2019, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/anthropocentrism.
29. Gansmo Jakobsen, "Environmental Ethics," 186.
30. Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, Bloomsbury Revelations, London; New York:
Bloomsbury, 2013, 51.
31. Harman, A new theory, 54.
32. Ibid, 56.
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much contention and confusion within mainstream philosophy and humanities circles. 
Harman relates that since "Speculative Realism is supposed to be about the world 
independent of humans, people assume that we want to talk about a world without 
humans. Thus I am sometimes asked questions such as 'What would an art without 
humans look like?' Harman responds by saying that "...we don’t need to talk about art in a 
post-apocalyptic world where humans are extinct; we only need to talk about art as not 
being exhausted by any particular human interpretation of it."33
These arguments have inspired me to transpose this idea to art and ask, "What would a 
flat aesthetics or flattened aesthetics look like?" It certainly seems that, like philosophy, at 
least fifty percent of art has been filled up with humans in some way or another, either by 
using humans as the subject of art or using nonhuman objects to represent the human 
condition. This is not to mention creating art that is not particularly preoccupied with the 
human condition but that requires commentary to specify the human artists' intentions or 
the inclusion of such commentary even when the art doesn't appear to need any. It seems 
we always need to attach the human to the art, we can’t just let the tin can sit there without
an artist label. In addition, artists seldom ask how their art affects the nonhuman realm. 
There are, of course, exceptions. 
Lynne Hull since 1985 has been engaged in what she calls "trans-species art" or art 
created for animals. This does not involve art that animals are meant to perceive as art, 
but rather sculptures that may be perceived as art by humans, but are designed 
specifically to provide animals with wildlife habitats. She has made "safe roosts for raptors 
in Wyoming, butterfly hibernation sculptures in Montana, salmon-spawning pools in 
Ireland, and nesting sites for wild ducks and geese in the Grizedale Forest Sculpture Park 
in England. Carved hydroglyphs capture water for desert wildlife, and floating art islands 
offer an inviting habitat for all sorts of aquatic species, from turtles and frogs to ducks and 
herons, to songbirds, swallows, and insects."34 In 1993, she made perches for frogs, toads,
and newts who were having trouble climbing out of their pool. In an interview, she spoke of
her sculptures as "eco-atonement."35 One can argue that her practice is still 
33. DeLanda and Harman, Rise of realism, 40.
34. Lynne Hull and R. J. Preece, “Lynne Hull Interview: Heart and Soul (2009),” Accessed December 30, 
2019. https://www.artdesigncafe.com/lynne-hull-art-interview.
35. Hull and Preece, “Interview.”
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anthropocentric in that it helped established her career, but it appears as if she mostly 
works behind the scenes. There is little documentation of her work online even though she
has collaborated with federal and state wildlife departments across the globe for the past 
30 years. Moreover, it appears that most of her works are not even accessible to humans 
or would rarely be viewed by them. Park rangers and scientists going about their jobs 
seem to be the most likely human spectators of her work. At the same time, based on 
interviews and documentation that is available, it is obvious that, apart from providing 
habitats for animals, she is equally concerned with the aesthetics of her sculptures even if 
no human will ever see them.
This represents one approach to art that is concerned with de-centering the human. It 
does so by prioritizing nonhuman over human engagement with the work. Another 
approach which I believe can be equally effective at de-centering the human is one that I 
have been hinting at throughout this thesis: inviting the human to engage with the 
nonhuman. This is the approach that I take in the works presented in this thesis. 
Specifically, I am interested in the act of speculation itself as a means of fostering 
nonanthropocentrism. 
I am framing this act of speculation as essentially a heightening of attention towards 
objects performing their own existence. My role as an artist has been, in part, to create a 
context that facilitates and invites this type of speculation.  What do I mean by “objects 
performing their own existence?” Here, I mean the “thing-in-itself” as it exists through time.
In the philosophical background presented earlier, the “thing-in-itself” was referred to as 
whatever it is about the object that exists independent of human awareness. This is not to 
say that the “thing-in-itself” exists independent of human existence, as of course, we 
cannot deny that the mug we use to drink our coffee is affected by our use of it. This is just
to say that our use and understanding of the mug does not exhaust the existence of the 
mug and that the mug has an existence apart from us, just as we have an existence apart 
from the mug. The antirealist versus realist debate is so focused on simply establishing 
whether or not the mug has its own existence apart from us that how the mug exists 
through time is side-stepped. In this philosophical debate, the existence of objects 
independent of human awareness appears to emphasize existence as a noun, not a verb, 
existence as the simple indication that the object is present but not that the object is 
presenting. 
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This is where composition can play a role. Composition, in its preoccupation with time and 
performance, can foreground not just the existence of the mug, but the mug existing. My 
proposal, therefore, is to think of existence itself as performative or “existence as 
performance.” Again, I will emphasize that “foregrounding objects performing their own 
existence” does not mean that I intend to present unmediated objects existing 
autonomously but that I invite human spectators to imagine objects existing autonomously.
In order to make this clearer, I will use a human example to demonstrate that this 
imaginative venture happens all the time in the social realm. 
Imagine a scenario in which you go towards the front of the bus to get off at your stop but 
then realize that you are still a couple stops away. Not wanting to stand the rest of the way,
you sit down on a seat directly facing the bus driver. Immediately, you notice the bus 
driver’s smooth handling of the steering wheel and the way her eyes seem calm and 
focused on an imaginary distant point up ahead. All the sudden, within that very minute, it 
is as if you are seeing the bus driver for the first time. You begin to wonder how many 
hours she has been driving this bus, how it is possible for her to stay awake, how does she
feel about her job, how does she feel, period. The bus driver who you knew was the 
person responsible for moving the vehicle that you were in and taking you to where you 
wanted to go, is now imbued with autonomous existence. 
This experience of seeing as if for the first time is not just relegated to individuals of 
society who normally appear anonymous to us. It happens amongst even those closest to 
us. At some point while growing up, it is quite normal for people in their adolescence or 
early adulthood to begin to wonder things about their parents they never wondered before.
What was my father like before I was born? What is it really like for my mom when she 
goes to work; what does she do out there for 8 hours a day? All the sudden it is as if you 
are seeing them for the first time and wondering about the multiple layers of their being. 
They immediately become extremely complex beings. “Who are these people I call my 
parents?” The question feels absurd but also frightening as you realize that the people 
who have raised you are not transparent, but rather a great mystery. Your parents, the bus 
driver, the garden plants in your neighborhood that you have just learned to identify by 
name, the small rock in your shoe, your car that is stalling on you unpredictably on the 
highway - these are all objects whose autonomous existence has been foregrounded. 
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Throughout years gradually or quickly within one moment, you notice these objects 
performing their own existence.    
The seeing as if for the first time experience is essentially what I am after when I attempt 
to foreground objects performing their existence within my own works. However, my 
objects, unlike bus drivers and parents, are nonhuman and some of the most unrelatable 
of nonhumans. I have a piece, for instance, that is simply an untitled folder, like the very 
ones that are most likely spread out in various locations of your computer that you never 
think about. It appears natural to adopt the “what is it like to be” mentality for the bus driver
or for your parents, but what about the untitled folder on a computer? The question, “What 
is it like to be an untitled folder?” sounds ridiculous because the first thing that comes to 
mind is the thought of us as humans trying to be like an untitled folder. However, 
remember that Nagel’s “What is It Like to Be a Bat?” is not about what is like for me to be 
a bat, but what is like for a bat to be a bat. So, the question is really, “What is like for an 
untitled folder to be an untitled folder?” For many, this may still seem like a ridiculous 
question, because the infinitive phrase in the question, to be, implies being, and being is 
often associated with entities possessing consciousness. One might argue, therefore, that 
it is not possible for the untitled folder to be anything, not even itself, because it does not 
possess consciousness, a necessary condition for being. 
This argument is supported by Nagel's "What it is like to be a Bat," and it is the reason 
Nagel chose the bat as his subject, as opposed to a plant or bacterium - both living beings 
but ones that are commonly believed to lack consciousness. Nagel's idea is that if we 
presume that all animals, including bats, possess consciousness then that means there is 
"something that it is like to be that organism - something it is like for the organism."36 
However, rather than narrow the definitions of "being" and "be" by relating them only to 
conscious entities, I use the expanded, more common definitions for "being"  and "be," 
provided by the Cambridge Dictionary: 
being: a person or thing that exists 
36. Although Nagel does not provide any justification for this extension of consciousness, we can assume 
that his justification has to do with that fact that humans are more evolutionarily and genetically similar to 
animals than any other kingdom.
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be: to exist37 
Here, existence is the only criteria for "being" and "be", with "be" emphasizing the real time
action or performativity of existing and "being" emphasizing the state of one's existence. 
Throughout the thesis, I will use "being" and "be" for any object that exists, which, in my 
view, is every object, including fictional and imaginary objects. With these definitions in 
mind, we can rephrase the question, "What is it like for an untitled folder to be an untitled 
folder?" into "What is it like for an untitled folder to exist as an untitled folder?" By replacing
"being" with "exist" the question might sound more scientific, as if I am implying that we 
investigate how an untitled folder exists exclusively from the standpoint of electrical 
engineering or computer programming, but, while this knowledge is relevant, as an artist, it
is not the only cognitive approach I would like to invoke. Here, I believe a quote by Ortega 
cited by Harman is especially useful as it approaches this very same notion of being as 
existence but through a poetic style of expression. 
“Just as there is an I-John Doe, there is also an I-red, an I-water, and an I-star. 
Everything, from a point of view within itself, is an I.”38 
Harman later clarifies the meaning of this phrase by saying, "Of course, Ortega does not 
wish to claim that inanimate objects can feel and think. Rather, he anticipates and refutes 
this objection in advance by saying that an object is an ‘I’ not because it is conscious, but 
simply because it is."39 Adopting Ortega's conception of being as the 'I' of something, the 
question regarding the untitled folder can also be rephrased as, "What is the I-untitled 
folder?" Lastly, if none of these aforementioned questions feel natural or comfortable to 
ask, we can ask a more conservative question, but one which I believe would achieve 
similar perspectival outcomes. Embedded within "What is it like to be?" is the phrase 
"What is it." If we simply ask, "What is it?," as in "What is an untitled folder?," I believe we 
will shortly find that even the most thorough technical, socio-politico, and cultural 
description of the folder does not exhaust what that folder actually is. There will be still 
some mystery unexhausted by our phenomenological experience of the folder that will 
invite us to speculate about the folder as it exists independent of our perspective, the 
folder as it is regardless of whether any one is looking at it, so to speak. 
37. “BEING | Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary,” Accessed December 30, 2019, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/being.
38. Harman, A new theory, 7.
39. Harman, A new theory, 77.
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To summarize, as an artist, I am interested in foregrounding objects performing their own 
existence. This is to say that I would like my work to facilitate a shift in perspective (or, at 
least, to establish conditions that would be amenable to such a shift), wherein one 
speculates the "what, when, where, and how" of objects existing independent of human 
awareness. I believe that such a perspectival shift is likely to be associated with the feeling
of seeing something as if for the first time and I believe it will motivate or be motivated by 
any one of the following questions, where x is any object: "What is it like for x to be x?," 
"What is it like for x to exist as x?," What is I-x?," and "What is x?" In addition, we might 
also include these simplified versions: "What is it like for x to be itself?" and "What is it like 
for x to exist as itself?" Lastly, I believe that like Lynn Hull's trans-species art, my art has 
the potential to foster nonanthropocentrism by inviting us humans to direct our attention 
outside ourselves, and, in so doing, to acknowledge that we represent only one of an 
infinite number of forms and ways of existing, of performing existence. 
Thus far, I've outlined the research questions, motivations, and principles underlying the 
work presented in this thesis, but I have yet to address the pragmatic "how" question 
regarding the execution of my work. How, as an artist, have I chosen to "foreground 
objects performing their existence?" The following discussion will address this question by 
focusing on themes behind my work, all of which were arrived at more through 
retrospective analysis than through pre-determined criteria, but which construct a sense of 
coherency when looking at my portfolio, as a whole.  
Aesthetic Practice 
My general intention behind the pieces presented in this thesis was to foreground objects 
performing their own existence or existence as performance. As I was composing the 
works, this intention manifested itself mainly through intuitive choices made on a piece-by-
piece basis. Apart from my research on realism and ontology, these choices were informed
by long-standing aesthetic influences, particularly the genres of Conceptual Art and 
Experimental Composition, the subgenres of Wandelweiser Collective, Arte Povera, 
Fluxus, Net Art, and the found music practices of composer Tom Johnson. As a result of 
my piece-by-piece approach and my divergent aesthetic influences there is a certain 
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diversity in the design, medium, and general character of the portfolio. Through 
retrospective analysis, though, I have identified the following two majors strands of 
decision-making that unify these pieces and which I now identify as the methodology or 
criteria I used to foreground objects performing existence: (1) use of common, found, or 
simple objects presented with minimal alterations, if any, and (2) integration of aesthetic 
cues within an ecological context, one in which objects exist and perform idiomatically in 
their "native habitat." This criteria will be elaborated below.
Use of common, found, or simple objects presented with minimal 
alterations
For most of my pieces, I direct focus on one basic object. Each object I have chosen 
clearly consists of objects within itself, and this multi-layered reality of objects is 
highlighted in some pieces more than others. However, there is usually one main object 
that represents the attentional nucleus of the piece. In my untitled folder piece, the 
attentional nucleus is the untitled folder, in another piece, for web browser, the attentional 
nucleus is, as one can guess, a web browser, and so on. 
Apart from directing attention to one basic object, I intentionally chose objects that were 
common, found, or simple, or that possessed of a combination of these attributes. Each of 
these attributes has potential in facilitating a "what-is-it-like" encounter with objects. A 
object that appears simple, like an untitled folder, assists in focusing attention on the basic 
object, as opposed to diverting attention to the relations between the object's intricate 
components or the dynamics of an object, which might be the case with an object that at 
least appears more complex, like a running car motor. Meanwhile, common and found 
objects, like untitled folders and web browsers, usually evoke strong associations with the 
utility and normal human mode of interaction with the objects. These strong pragmatic 
associations have the capacity to intensify our perceptual transformation from a 
preliminary, routine blindness towards the object to a seeing the object as if for the first 
time, and then seeing (in the sense of discovering) that object everywhere in our lives. Use
of common objects, therefore, provides especially ripe opportunities for alluding to a 
mysterious autonomous existence happening everywhere, just under our nose; it is the 
pillow we sleep on, the tea kettle we use every morning, and the web browser with which 
we interact, sometimes more than with any other person or thing. In my pieces, I present 
objects like these with little to no alterations in the actual material or appearance of the 
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object. This, I believe, only further invites attention towards the object performing itself, as 
opposed to the human, artistic shaping of the object. 
Integration of aesthetic cues within an ecological context
Ecological context here is used in the same way as in psychology to refer to a context in 
which things happen in the manner in which they are most likely to happen. For example, 
let’s consider a scientific experiment that investigates whether mothers singing lullabies to 
their babies decreases stress levels for their babies. For this experiment, a laboratory 
setting at a university or a hospital would not be considered an ecological context as this is
not where the mothers normally sing lullabies to their infants. An ecological context could 
be established if the research, instead, was conducted at the homes of the mothers with 
an unobtrusive, digital recorder and heart-rate monitoring devices capturing the relevant 
data while the mother sings lullabies to her baby at the usual time with no researchers 
present, as if it were a normal day.
For my goal of presenting “objects performing themselves,” I find it important to keep the 
context as ecological as possible for all parties involved, spectators and art objects 
included. An untitled folder, for instance, is within an ecological context when it is on 
someone’s computer not really doing much. Likewise, an ecological context for the 
spectator may be one in which the spectator encounters the untitled folder on their 
computer at home, at work, or in transit. I find that keeping the context ecological facilitates
the seeing for the first time experience in which you begin to speculate on the real life of 
the object. For that reason, I also avoid presenting my pieces at or associating my pieces 
with highly fabricated or institutionalized aesthetic contexts, as these are often the 
antithesis of an ecological context for common, simple objects. 
Duchamp's Fountain, for instance, is not about the power of the urinal as an object existing
whether we look at it or not, but rather about the power of the aesthetic context to 
transform the urinal into something completely different. It seems that the greatest 
achievement of Conceptual Art is proving to the world that any object can be turned into art
when presented within the "artworld." I use artworld as defined by George Dickie in his 
1974 essay "What is art? An institutional analysis," to refer to the "bundle of systems" (e.g.
"theater, painting, sculpture, literature, music,"etc) and all the agents involved in the 
systems (e.g. artists, curators, producers, museum directors, museum-goers, art critics, art
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educators, art historians, art theorists, etc) who are involved with conferring the status of 
art upon objects and with keeping "the machinery of the artworld working."40 Within the 
framework of an "institutional theory of art," neither Duchamp, his colleagues, nor his 
predecessors invented the "conferring of the status of art; they simply used an existing 
institutional device."41 Harnessing the power of the artworld to trigger our aesthetic stance 
towards objects has proven to be effective. However, turning everything into art is 
celebrated at the expense of losing the object that once was, the object before it was 
turned into art. After 100 plus years of canonization, how many people see a urinal when 
they see the Fountain? Even if you were to try hard, is it even possible to see it as a 
urinal? The Fountain is reminiscent of those visual illusions, where once you see the 
hidden face in the drawing you can't unsee it. The face in the Fountain is that of Marcel 
Duchamp. As you stare at the object, the artist stares back at you. Therefore, in regards to 
foregrounding objects' autonomous existence, there are two related challenges posed by a
highly manufactured or institutional art context: (1) in the process of  being transformed 
into "art" our perception of the original, pre-artworld (or non-artworld) object is lost, and (2) 
it can be difficult or impossible to regain perception and appreciation of the original object. 
The latter point is simply that institutionalized aesthetic contexts promote  irreversible 
perceptual transformations of objects from "non-art" to "art." The concepts of irreversible 
and reversible aesthetic perspectives are central to my idea of ecological contexts and the 
ways in which the autonomous existence of objects can be foregrounded. In order to 
explain them as clearly as possible I will use metaphors within the field of chemistry that I 
find particularly effective. Organic and inorganic life is replete with examples of both 
irreversible and reversible chemical reactions. Take the example of combustion, which 
occurs when an organic compound, like a hydrocarbon, reacts with oxygen to produce 
carbon dioxide and water:
CxHy+O2→CO2+H2O42
40. George Dickie, "What is art? An institutional analysis," Art and the Aesthetic: an institutional analysis 
(1974): 430-431.
41. Dickie, “What is art?”, 430.
42. Heather Yee and Mandeep Sohal, “Reversible vs. Irreversible Reactions,” Libretexts: Chemistry, last 





What makes this reaction irreversible is that the products of the reaction, the carbon 
dioxide and the water, cannot react with each other to convert back into the starting 
reactants, hydrocarbon and oxygen. 
In contrast, reversible reactions are those in which products of the reaction convert back 
into the reactants and so forth. As this chemistry text beautifully puts it, 
In reversible reactions, the reactants and products are never fully consumed; 
they are each constantly reacting and being produced...These two reactions are
occurring simultaneously, which means that the reactants are reacting to yield 
the products, as the products are reacting to produce the reactants.43
An example of a reversible reaction is one in which salt (sodium chloride) reacts with 
limestone (calcium carbonate) to produce salt crystals (sodium carbonate) and calcium 
chloride. This reaction happens all the time in salt lakes around the world, in which the salt
in the lake reacts with limestone to form salt crystals around the edges of the lake, while at
the same time the salt crystals react with calcium chloride and are converted back into salt
and limestone.44
2NaCl + CaCO3  Na2CO3+ CaCl2⇆ 45
The forward and backward reactions can happen at different rates, but when they occur at 
the same rate (the salt is converted into crystals at the same rate that the crystals are 
converted into salt), it is said that the reaction is at chemical equilibrium.46
43. Ibid.
44. “Napoleon and the Scientific Expedition to Egypt | Linda Hall Library.” Accessed December 31, 2019. 
https://napoleon.lindahall.org/soda_lakes.shtml.






The irreversible reaction of combustion I liken to the irreversible transformation of our 
perception of an object after its integration into the "artworld," from "non-art object" to "art 
object. I represent this below, appropriating the form of a chemical equation: 
everyday perspective + object  → aesthetic perspective + object 
The everyday perspective is one that the ecological context invites, namely one that views 
the object as it normally would with the object itself in an environment where it is typically 
found, performing its existence as it typically does (e.g. a spectator viewing an untitled 
folder as a non-descript, trivial folder sitting in some random location on one's computer, 
without the spectator remembering or caring about how it got there). The aesthetic 
perspective is a bit harder to define and depends on the cultural context, but, at least 
within Western cultures, it has been associated with prolonged attention and interest 
towards objects,47 distance from everyday practical concerns,48 a sense of access to the 
interiority of objects (a "touching without touching"),49 and a greater appreciation of objects 
as things-in-themselves as opposed to merely tools. Meanwhile, the object in this equation
is the "real object,"50 the one that is independent of our human perception of it and is 
therefore represented the same on either side of the equation. 
A reversible transformation in aesthetic perception can be represented similarly, but while 
using the chemical symbol, , to indicate reversibility:⇆
everyday perspective + object   aesthetic perspective + object ⇆
It is easy enough to imagine how the irreversible transformation in perception occurs and I 
have already given examples with regards to Duchamp's Fountain, but how does the 
reversible one occur? First, I would like to establish that the "everyday perspective" and 
"aesthetic perspective" are not strict, non-overlapping categories, but, instead, can be 
47. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 1917, in Twentieth-Century Literary Theory: A Reader, 2nd Edition 
edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997), 24.
48. Yuriko Saito, “Everyday Aesthetics,” Philosophy and Literature 25, no. 1 (2001), 91.
49. Harman, A new theory, 82.
50. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object,  Reprint edition, Winchester, U.K. Washington, USA: Zero 
Books, 2011, 48.
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thought of as idealized poles on a spectrum mapping out a tendency in perception to view 
an object either as a means-towards-an-end, ordinary tool of human daily consumption or 
as an aesthetic entity appreciated as an end-in-itself. Our actual perception of an object is 
likely to lie somewhere in a complex, non-linear middle of the spectrum, with aesthetic and
pragmatic perspectives intertwined. For example, the pragmatic effort of environmentalists 
to protect species and ecosystems is shaped largely by what the general public finds to be
the most aesthetically pleasing entities in nature, "such as pandas, whales, seals, and 
redwoods, but not cod, insects, prairies, and wetlands, which may be in more dire need of 
protection."51 Yuriko Saito uses this example to argue that "the aesthetic and the practical 
cannot be neatly separated."52  Based on the simultaneity and inseparability of aesthetic 
and practical dimensions, it may seem that my reversible equation above is merely a 
representation of how we normally perceive everyday objects. If this were the case, one 
might ask why it is necessary for an artist, such as myself, to proactively contribute 
anything aesthetic to the ecological context given that we spontaneously aestheticize 
everyday objects all the time. I do, indeed, consider the reversible equation to be a 
representation of how we normally perceive objects within an ecological context, but, 
within this context, our aesthetic perspective is often subconscious. This can be thought of 
as a side effect, in part, of our cultural attempts to isolate the "artworld" from the practical 
world of "eating, clothing, dwelling, cleaning, and dealing with natural elements.”53 We are 
trained to believe that the aesthetic perspective belongs here, in the museum, and not 
there, in the kitchen. For this reason, we tend to think of everyday objects and activities as 
"created, used, or performed first and foremost for nonaesthetic purposes. We clean our 
kitchen and bathroom for hygiene, cook and eat food for nutrition, and select our clothes 
for protection and comfort. Utensils and furniture are created, used, and appreciated for 
their respective use."54  Saiko points out that this is characteristic of Western industrialized 
cultures, and that other cultures, including Balinese and Inuit cultures, "lack the Western 
notion of art and artist because they embrace the aesthetic concerns in everything they do 
and make."55 Therefore, I believe that, at least within Western industrialized cultures, I can 
contribute something novel to the normal "everyday perspective  aesthetic perspective" ⇆
51. Saito, “Everyday Aesthetics,” 94.





equation; I can promote increased awareness and development of one's aesthetic 
perspective towards everyday objects as everyday objects (not specifically art objects). 
This point is captured nicely by Saiko when she uses the example of aestheticizing a knife 
while using the knife as it normally would be used: 
At this point, those who advocate an art-based aesthetic theory may remind us 
that if we distance ourselves from everyday practical concerns, if we adopt a 
disinterested attitude, we can attend to the aesthetic values of everyday objects 
and activities. I have no doubt we can and sometimes do just that. I can, for 
example, contemplate on my knife as if it were a piece of sculpture. However, 
doing so would compromise its aesthetic value by unduly limiting various 
sensory inputs which are all integrated into our everyday experience of the 
object. The aesthetic value of a knife consists not only of its visual qualities and 
its feel in my hand, determined by its surface texture, weight, and balance but, 
most importantly, by how smoothly and effortlessly I can cut an object with it.56 
Saiko here focuses on how aestheticizing the everyday knife involves appreciation of all its
phenomenological qualities and functions. However, I believe that in addition to 
appreciating the phenomenological aspects of objects, aestheticizing everyday objects as 
they perform their "executant reality" invites us to wonder about the objects outside our 
use of them.57 
The perspective we adopt in strong, institutionalized aesthetic contexts is associated with 
habitual behaviors, such as prolonged attention towards objects, that can be triggered by 
even the slightest aesthetic cues (simply associating an object with an art title regardless 
of the setting). In "Art as Technique " (1917), Viktor Shklovsky famously remarked that the 
"technique of art is to...increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process
of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged." This is corroborated by 
the last ten years of research in neuroaesthetics and art psychology, which demonstrates 
that spectators spend a significant amount of time viewing artworks, with mean viewing 
durations of 10 to 40 seconds according to museum and laboratory studies in which 
"viewers are allowed to view art at their own pace." Meanwhile, research indicates that it 
only takes a fraction of a second to perceive objective features of an art piece (The actual 
content, such as the geometric forms in art, can be processed within 10 ms, while the style
56. Ibid, 92.
57. Harman, A new theory, 81.
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of art pieces can be recognized within 50 ms). 58 Based, in part, on this fact that viewers 
spend far more time viewing the artwork than is needed to process its basic features, 
Helmut and Nadal (2014) have proposed that "what makes a experience aesthetic is its 
long extension in time, which allows for several cycles of feedback and feedforward 
influence among processes related to perception, cognition and emotion." They clarify that 
"this does not just mean that aesthetic episodes can last longer, but that the nature of an 
aesthetic episode is, precisely, an extended time devoted to perception-cognition-emotion 
interactions."59 In addition, dramatic shifts in perception and emotional valence related to 
the "aesthetic episode" is observed not just in museum contexts, but in laboratory contexts
in which participants are presented with photographs of realistic events and are simply told
that the photographs are art.60 In fact, for several laboratory experiments investigating the 
effect of an “art context” versus “non-art context,” this is the common protocol: use one set 
of stimuli that can be viewed as art as easily as it can viewed as non-art, tell one group of 
participants that the stimuli is art and the other group of participants that the stimuli is not 
art, and record differences in their processing of and response to the stimuli. 
Based on this empirical research and my intuition, I am confident that even the barest of 
artistic cues can trigger the attributes of aesthetic perspective, particularly that of 
prolonged attention and interest. This is important because I believe that prolonged  
attention is central to facilitating the "what is it" and "what is it like to be" questions directed
towards objects. The aesthetic cues I provide when presenting my pieces are not as 
blatant as the laboratory experiments in which participants are simply told "this is art," and 
they vary depending on the piece. For the untitled folder piece, for instance, I have simply 
uploaded an empty, untitled folder on my account on archive.org, which provides my full 
name, and I allow the folder to be downloaded accompanied by the following text, "This is 
an empty folder that I found on my hard-drive."61 In this case, the presence of my name 
alone may serve as a strong aesthetic cue, as any one interested in looking me up will 
soon discover from my website (and most likely from posts by others) that I am an artist. 
58. Helmut Leder and Marcos Nadal, “Ten Years of a Model of Aesthetic Appreciation and Aesthetic 
Judgments : The Aesthetic Episode - Developments and Challenges in Empirical Aesthetics.” British Journal 
of Psychology 105, no. 4 (November 2014): 448. 
59. Leder and Nadal, “ Ten Years of a Model of Aesthetic Appreciation and Aesthetic Judgments,” 449.
60. Valentin Wagner, Winfried Menninghaus, Julian Hanich, and Thomas Jacobsen. “Art Schema Effects on 
Affective Experience: The Case of Disgusting Images,” Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts 8, 
no. 2 (May 2014): 120–29.
61. This is just one realization of the piece, and, as such, this text is not part of a score for the piece. The 
piece does not have a score.
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Even if my name isn't searched, though, the fact that this is an empty, untitled folder which 
has been assigned no explicit use, but which I believed to be valuable enough to offer as a
download, invites people to consider the untitled folder more aesthetically than they did 
before. At the very least, spectators might wonder why someone else values the folder 
enough to share it with the world when ordinarily it doesn't seem to have much value. They
might look at the folder more than they would otherwise, even if it is just to double-check 
that it is indeed just an empty folder. Already, they begin wondering about this folder more 
than they have ever wondered about an empty, untitled folder (either that or they 
immediately think I am crazy and continue wandering the web). 
There are other pieces that will provide somewhat more aesthetic cues. For jorge.png, I 
plan on uploading an image in PNG format. The text accompanying the piece will say that 
the image is a photograph taken by composer Mark So of a page in his notebook, and that
the photo was originally a JPG file but has been converted to a PNG file. This, obviously, 
provides plentiful aesthetic cues, from the naming of an artist Mark So as the photographer
to the identification of the image as a page in a composer’s notebook. In this case, the 
aesthetic cues may very well trigger the common effect of "prolonged" viewing time (e.g. 
10 - 40 seconds). Spectators might closely compare the JPG to PNG photos to see if they 
can tell the difference and if they cannot they might wonder perhaps, for the first time, what
is the real difference between a JPG and a PNG? What is this object that we call jpeg and 
that we call png? 
 
However, regardless of how dominant the aesthetic cue, I believe the ecological context in 
which my pieces are presented (e.g. an untitled folder as a domestic download as 
opposed to a projection on a gallery wall) is strong enough to maintain some degree of 
attention towards the everyday object, the object as it exists at home, so to speak. 
Moreover, the presentation of the object in an ecological context helps ensure that the 
natural, reversible manner in which our everyday and aesthetic perspectives form and 
interact will be maintained, even while we become more aware and intentional in our 
aestheticization of the object. In this sense, the beneficial attributes of the aesthetic 
perspective with the strong practical associations of everyday objects in their everyday 
context presents a promising opportunity for aesthetic perspectives to be consciously 
developed and integrated into our everyday perspective of objects. A crude take-home 
motto for my aesthetic goal, therefore, may be "to see the object as an end-in-itself while 
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continuing to use it as a means-towards-an-end." Let's still use the untitled folder, 
download it out of curiosity, fill it up with files, rename it, and delete it; but, let's also wonder
about the untitled folder, about what it is, what it means for it to exist, let's see it as if for 
the first time.  
 
Returning for one last time to the metaphor of the reversible chemical equation, the salt 
lake is an environment that consists of a combination of both salt crystals and salt at 
varying proportions depending on the rate at which salt crystals are formed versus salt. 
Both salt crystals and salt are simultaneously reacting with other compounds to convert 
into the form of the other. I'd like to think that our psyche is like this salt lake, a flexible, 
dynamic environment in which at any moment our perception reacts with objects to form 
more or less aesthetic or everyday perspectives. At any moment, this psyche can be 
dominated by a perspective that is more aesthetic or more everyday, or it may even attain 
an equilibrium in which aesthetic perspectives are formed as often as everyday 
perspectives, but the overall conditions of the context is such that the reaction always 
maintains this reversibility. Throughout the thesis, I will integrate the aforementioned 
principles of realism and aesthetic reversibility in the analysis of my pieces.
Precedents
In this section, I will discuss a handful of pieces by other artists that I believe can be easily 
interpreted with regards to objects performing their own existence, even when such an 




Comedian (2019) by Cattelan consisted of a single ripe banana duct-taped to a wall. Three
limited-editions of the installation were sold at Art Basel Miami, each for $120,000 to 
$150,000.62 The buyers purchased the "concept of the piece, which comes with a 
certificate of authenticity from the artist, along with installation instructions."63 The 
instructions gives ironically specific instructions on how to tape the banana to the wall, at  
what height to tape it, and suggests that the banana be changed "depending on aesthetic 
appearance, every 7 - 10 days."64
Apparently, Cattelan first conceived of the work as a sculpture of a banana, and 
experimented with renditions using resin, bronze, and painted bronze. Not having decided 
yet on its final realization, he hung a banana in his hotel room 'to find inspriation,' finally 
deciding to use a real banana instead.65 This proved to be an adequate choice, with New 
York Times reporting in its headlines that "The $120,000 Banana Wins Art Basel." The 
success of the piece was appraised by the exorbitant degree of interest that it attracted. 
Huge crowds were flocking to the see and take pictures of the banana each day of the fair,
so much so that, at one point, Miami Beach officers were enlisted to "guard the banana."66 
Eventually, the "Mona Lisa-like" attention the banana was attracting prompted gallery 
administrators to take down the banana before the fair even ended, issuing in a statement 
that "the installation caused several uncontrollable crowd movements and the placement 
of the work on our booth compromised the safety of the artwork around us, including that 
of our neighbors.”67 Even after the installation was removed, though, the piece lived on. 
The banana now has its own Instagram account and has inspired several takeoff postings 
62. Neil Vigdor, “A $120,000 Banana Is Peeled From an Art Exhibition and Eaten,” The New York Times, 
December 7, 2019, sec. Arts. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/07/arts/art-basel-banana-eaten.html.
63. Robin Pogrebin. “Banana Splits: Spoiled by Its Own Success, the $120,000 Fruit Is Gone.” The New 
York Times, December 8, 2019, sec. Arts. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/arts/design/banana-
removed-art-basel.html.
64. Robin Pogrebin. “That Banana on the Wall? At Art Basel Miami It’ll Cost You $120,000.” The New York 
Times, December 6, 2019, sec. Arts. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/arts/design/banana-art-basel-
miami.html.
65. Pogrebin, “That Banana on the Wall?”
66. Vigdor, “A $120,000 Banana Is Peeled.”
67. Pogrebin, “Banana Splits.”
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of people duct-taping mundane objects to the wall, such as a piece of bread and an 
apple.68 Some articles have even called the piece the "most talked-about artwork of 
2019."69
There are has been a barrage of conflicting opinions published by art critics, with some 
calling it genius and others calling it bad art, their argument being that "there is nothing at 
stake in the statement it makes" given the 100 plus years of Conceptual Art that has 
already passed. 7071 However, even if we agree that this piece does not disrupt the "status 
quo" of Conceptual Art in any way, there is still something to be said about the fact that this
unaltered, simple, common, found object attracted so much attention. If indeed, the piece 
was just a concept as even Cattelan's assistant Perrotin has stated, then why did so many 
people push through the crowds and wait for hours in a line to see it live?72 Even if the 
primary objective in seeing the banana live is to take an Instagram photo and prove to the 
world that you were there, the point remains that you having a live confrontation with the 
real banana was significant. Therefore, while the piece can be interpreted in regards to the
financial value we place on goods or the absurdity of high art, it can also be interpreted as 
the power of a single object existing. Here, existence was performance quite literally. 
68. Ibid.
69. artnet News. “Maurizio Cattelan’s ‘Comedian,’ Explained: Here’s Everything We Published on the Viral 
Banana Art, All in One Place,” December 17, 2019. https://news.artnet.com/art-world/maurizio-cattelan-
banana-explained-1732773.
70. Luke O’Neil, “One Banana, What Could It Cost? $120,000 – If It’s Art,” The Guardian, December 6, 2019,
sec. Art and design, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2019/dec/06/maurizio-cattelan-banana-duct-
tape-comedian-art-basel-miami.
71. Alec Recinos, “A Banana Taped to a Wall Sold for $120,000 at a Miami Art Fair. Here’s Why It Wasn’t 
Good,” Insider. Accessed December 31, 2019, https://www.insider.com/the-120000-art-basel-banana-
actually-wasnt-good-art-2019-12.
72. Pogrebin, “That Banana on the Wall?”
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Figure 1: Comedian (2019) by Maurizio Cattelan. 
Benjamin Sutton, photographer, “The buyers of two editions of Maurizio Cattelan’s banana artwork were 
revealed,” , Artsy, 2019, https://www.artsy.net/news.
Sealed Computers 
Bolognini's Sealed Computers are groups of computers interconnected with cables, many 
still on display on gallery floors and which have been continuously generating random 
images since 1992. What makes them "sealed" is that the monitor buses of the computers 
are closed, meaning that no human can actually see the images that the computers 
generate. This piece relates to several aforementioned themes, not least of which is the 
general notion behind realism. In this work, computers generate images, which by 
definition are objects to be seen, but which, in a sense, only the computers 'see.' The 
images generated by the computers exist whether the humans see them or not. The artist 
states that flow of images the computers have been generating "without interruption for 
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twenty years" is "real" and "has an existence independent of the observer."73 Bolognini 
suggests that the work is designed to shift the "barycentre from the artist who imagines 
things to the devices that create them autonomously," and that it is for this reason that he 
leaves the "machines working indefinitely."74 
One reoccurring impression echoed by art critics regards the sense of inaccessibility when
confronting the work. Faust from NY Arts Magazine writes that "Bolognini's cryptic universe
is silent and inaccessible as a galaxy."75 This inaccessibility resonates with Harman's 
concept of the withdrawal of all "real objects"76 and DeLanda's notion of the impracticability
of ever achieving full knowledge of an object. The work as a whole seems to parallel nicely
Harman's claim that we humans can only ever allude to an object as it exists independent 
of our awareness, but that aesthetics is particularly effective at such allusions. In this 
sense, the glaring inaccessibility of the piece becomes itself an invitation to access the 
object through imagination. This is what I have previously suggested as the potential for 
nonanthropocentric art to invite speculation on the autonomous existence of objects. 
Bolognini himself implies that this is precisely what he enjoys about the piece, stating that 
"even when I think of the parallel (not visible) information universe of signs drawn by my 
sealed machines, it pleases me more to know that a complex and intricate landscape is 
being created," an intricate landscape which he also refers to as "parallel universes."77 For 
Bolognini, imagining these parallel universes is valuable, stimulating, and a motivation for 
creating these works. 
Creative media practitioner Garfield Benjamin perhaps makes an even more direct 
statement with regards to the invitation for speculation motivated by the computers' 
inaccessibility or "void,” stating that "the process by which we speculatively engage with 
the unrepresentable and inaccessible void is the creation of limit, staging a similar 
conceptual space against which the antagonism of denied direct engagement forces the 
73. Maurizio Bolognini, “Computer Sigillati/Sealed Computers,” Accessed December 31, 2019, 
https://www.bolognini.org/foto/index.htm.
74. Maurizio Bolognini, “Programmed Machines: Infinity and Identity” Accessed December 31, 2019. 
https://www.bolognini.org/lectures/GA04.htm.
75. Bolognini, “Computer Sigillati/Sealed Computers.”
76. Harman, Quadruple Object, 46.
77. Bolognini, "Programmed Machines".
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spectator to examine the relation of the surface of the work and of their own parallax 
position to what might lie beneath."78 It is, therefore, our human engagement with what 
appears to be an unrepresentable and inaccessible void that pushes us to speculate on 
what "might lie beneath." In this case, I conceive Bolognini's effort to "present" as opposed
to "represent" as a technique that effectively foregrounds objects performing their own 
existence.79
Figure 2: Bolognini’s Sealed Computers on display. “Maurizio Bolognini: Computer 
Sigillati/Sealed Computers.” Accessed January 5, 2020. https://www.bolognini.org/foto/.
Internet Soul Portraits  
Internet Soul Portraits (2005) is a series of altered images that depict well-known 
homepages devoid of their text-based content. When you encounter the project online, it 
feels as if you are flipping through an eerie photo gallery of ghost towns from cyberspace. 
The characteristic layout, color-scheme, and style of graphical icons from homepages, 
such as Google, Yahoo, Amazon, BestBuy and eBay, remain intact, but all they form are 
empty icons and empty boxes within boxes. One immediately is impressed by how these 
basic surface features of the pages' web design reveal the identity of the website. Upon 
viewing an image of a white background with one long, white slender icon in the center of 
the page and two smaller white icons below it, you know immediately that you are staring 
at the ghost of Google's homepage. Yet, not only does it feel you are confronting the 
vestige of Google, but that you are staring at the "soul" of Google, hence Callahan's title. 
The text-less containers that compose this site are the site itself, in the sense that they 
78. Bolognini, “Computer Sigillati/Sealed Computers.”
79. Ibid.
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capture the site's character immediately, even though normally we never pay attention to 
these icons apart from our use of them. We know these icons at the autonomic level; we 
are so familiar with them that we are blind to them. They form the psychic cyber-waters 
that we swim through on a daily-basis. By laying bare these "functionless" icons, we are 
confronted with the graphical objects themselves. Containers of information are 
themselves information. The void they present when stripped of text transmits a new type 
of content or meaning and, as mentioned in relation to Bolognini's Sealed Computers, this 
void invites viewers to speculate on the surface layers of the web that always lie beneath 
our perception and daily use but that are staring at us all the time. In this piece, in 
particular, there is a sense that the invisible surface layers of the web are made visible, 
and in making them visible we realize that they had been performing themselves all along, 
regardless of whether we were "looking." 
Figure 3: A screenshot of Internet Soul Portraits (Yahoo) “Internet Soul Portraits.” 
Accessed January 4, 2020. http://mazamedia.com/isp/index.html.
30
Figure 4: A screenshot of Internet Soul Portraits (Best Buy) “Internet Soul Portraits.” 
Accessed January 4, 2020. http://mazamedia.com/isp/bestbuy.htm.
observing objects
The piece observing objects was co-composed by Eva-Maria Houben, Rebecca Lane, and
Samuel E. Dunscombe. This piece presents five six-note chords separated by breath 
marks. Analyzed using Allen Forte’s nomenclature the chords are 6-Z50, 6-Z25, 6-30, 6-
Z24, and 6-Z50, respectively. There does not seem to be any significant relation amongst 
the five chords besides the fact that they are all hexachords. Houben's excerpt from the 
performance notes states the following:
we did not feel time passing by, we got lost. then we wished to do this again and
again. we like to be busy with a few sounds; then we had a pause; then we 
were busy with other sounds… and so on. in each case we observed this 
assembly of sounds by playing and listening-and recognized that we truly met 
each other.
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Figure 5: The five chords in observing objects. Houben, Eva-Maria. observing objects, 
Haan: Edition WandelweiserGmbH, 2017.
It may initially appear counter-intuitive to use this piece as an example for foregrounding 
the autonomous existence of objects. After all, the sounds that make up the chords and 
the notion of the chord itself requires human performative action and perception, 
respectively. However, there are several aspects of the piece that allude to the autonomy 
of these auditory objects, with an obvious one being the title itself, observing objects. 
Observing denotes noticing something about an entity particularly through paying careful 
attention to it. Moreover, observing connotates discovery. The title suggests, therefore, 
that these auditory objects demonstrate at least some degree of independence from our 
thoughts, otherwise why would we observe them carefully from the outside, expecting to 
notice or discover something from within? In addition, the fact that the title is observing 
objects and not observing chords implies that we are observing something that is not 
simply a correlate of the musical human mind. An object can be anything, whereas a 
“chord” depend on our human perception. In addition, the piece separates these objects 
with breath marks, only adding to their sense of distinctiveness or autonomy, not only in 
relation to our perception, but in relation to each other. From a compositional standpoint, 
this characterization of chords as distinct objects is atypical. Historically, chords have been
depicted as ephemeral smears of tone-objects or, when they have been object-like, they 
are often simply links in a chain, whether that chain be narrative or non-narrative. Hence, 
chords tend to be either connective tissue or a verticalized web of sound within which we 
can loose ourselves. It is more of an exception to treat chords as distinct units in space - 
units that transcend their linear relationships with one another and the density of their 
sonic mass individually. Lastly, although Houben's performance notes focuses on human 
perception of the objects, she highlights the existence of objects first and then 
performance and perception of objects secondarily. For instance, instead of saying that 
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"we played this assembly of sounds and then listened to and observed them," she says 
"we observed this assembly of sounds by playing and listening." These objects outside our
immediate control is the focus on the piece. "Playing and listening" are simply framed as 
the means through which we can get at these objects. This resonates with a quote by 
sound artist Francisco Lopez in reference to frog calls, "As soon as the call is in the air, it 
doesn't belong to the frog that produced it anymore."80 Likewise, based on Houben's 
reversed order of operations (observing objects first, playing and listening second), we 
might say that as soon as the chord is in the air, it doesn't belong to the performer who 
produced it anymore. 
20170 (20abril2018) 
Werder's 20abril2018 is one among many pieces in his ongoing work "20170." The work 
began when Werder acquired a large stack of old paper in a flea market in 2017 and will 
continue until Werder has used up all the pages for his typewritten scores. Werder 
considers the creation of each score an "actualization" of the score. As Werder says of this
work, "writing a score is its performance, and it doesn't need to be performed again. 
Because at the end it's all about engaging with something."81 The score for 20abril2018 
consists of a single line of text: separa un silenzio dal silenzio ("separate a silence from 
silence"). Given that the piece doesn't need to be performed again and that there are 
indeed no instructions for how to do so, any actualization outside of Werder's creation of 
this score is open to interpretation. In contemplating the text "separate a silence from 
silence," an act which in itself I may consider to be an actualization of the score, I am 
drawn towards the ontology of silence and, in particular, the haecceity or "thisness" of 
silence. The text "separate a silence from silence" seems to point towards a silence that is 
itself a multi-dimensional, autonomous object. We can, for instance, speculate that an 
object (a silence) exists within a larger object (the silence) and that both consists of 
enough autonomy to be, at the same time, separate from one another. The strangeness of 
80. Daniele V., “Francisco López [ Essays // Environmental Sound Matter ],” Accessed December 31, 2019, 
http://www.franciscolopez.net/env.html.
81. Manfred Werder and Andrew C. Smith, “Their Interference Is Actually Their Realization: Manfred Werder 
& Andrew C. Smith,” Medium, February 1, 2019, https://medium.com/@anindexofmusic/their-interference-is-
actually-their-realization-manfred-werder-andrew-c-smith-f977001570a6.
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such a multidimensional approach to silence embues the object with great mystery. 
Biguenet captures this mystery of silence when he says, 
 
So though an object with which most of us feel intimately acquainted, silence is,
in fact, a domain about which we can hazard only guesses, guesses our 
scientists sometimes validate, while its former kingdom, the ineffable, continues 
to contract. But even if silence remains forever beyond our reach, the notion of 
such a supposed emptiness is, like the placeholder zero, an object whose utility 
is inexhaustible--and whose value in a clamorous world soars.82 
Werder's piece presents this familiar object of silence while at the same time highlighting 
its mysterious nature that no amount of human interpretation or characterization can 
exhaust. As objects, both a silence and the silence within Werder's text are irreducible 
placeholders, with the ambiguity of the fragmentary text leaving us to speculate what they 
are placeholders for. 
Practice
In this section, I will discuss pieces of mine that I believe are particularly relevant in 
regards to foregrounding objects performing their own existence and the notion of 
existence as performance. The first three pieces focus on digital objects, while the last 
work presents scores for open instrumentation. In addition to their common medium of the 
digital, the first three pieces are unified by my intention to make visible the normally 
invisible layers or realities of a digital object, what I refer to as daylighting the digital. 
I borrow the term "daylighting" from ecology, which uses the term to refer to the process of 
"removing obstructions which are covering a river, creek, or drainage way and restoring 
them to their previous condition."83 In essence, daylighting a stream does exactly what it 
says, it brings daylight to the stream by removing the human structures, such as the 
parking lots, buildings, or roads, that are built on top of it. Apart from benefiting the 
stream's ecosystem, daylighting a stream contributes enormously to our aesthetic 
82. John Biguenet, Silence, 01 edition, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015, 6.
83. Naturally Resilient Communities, “Daylighting Rivers and Streams – Naturally Resilient Communities.” 
Accessed December 31, 2019. http://nrcsolutions.org/daylighting-rivers/.
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appreciation of the stream, with most people not even knowing about the stream's 
existence until the pavement that covers it is removed. All the sudden a stream that had 
been flowing for decades below a gigantic parking lot in your local neighborhood is now 
flowing in broad daylight. I apply a similar idea to daylighting the digital. There is a 
multiplicity of digital objects, digital streams, if you will, whose ongoing 'flow' is covered 
from our perception. Digital objects are often perceived as flat, one-dimensional objects, 
like pavement forming a surface, with no hidden streams underneath. With the next few 
pieces, I have attempted to daylight the existence of digital objects that are normally 
hidden by our one-dimensional, abstracted representations of them and by our proclivity to
approach digital objects exclusively as tools rendering even their most visible aspects, 
invisible. 
untitled_folder
The UNIX philosophy is often quoted as 'everything is a file', but that really 
means 'everything is a stream of bytes.’   
 - Linus Torvalds
This piece is realized by any empty, untitled folder performing its existence on any device, 
anywhere. The UNIX philosophy behind Linux software describes every object on an 
operating system as a file, including device drivers, directories, and folders themselves. 
From this perspective, a folder is simply a type of file, one designed to store other files. 
Linus Torvalds, creator of the Linux kernel, expands upon this seemingly simplistic 
philosophy that 'everything is a file,' by emphasizing that every file is in fact a unique 
stream of bytes or a collection of zeros and ones. However, most users only consciously 
interact with a text-based title or graphical icon for a file, the virtual outer-most surface of 
the file. The text "Untitled folder" and a visual icon of an empty folder is the object that we 
ordinarily perceive when we confront an empty, untitled folder. 
Typically, when we create an empty, untitled folder, we immediately rename it and fill it up 
with other files. If not, we often forget about it. If we notice it again, we look inside it to 
remind ourselves of whether this is a folder with data that we forgot to name or whether it 
really is empty. If it is empty, we often delete it so that we don't become distracted by it 
again. Sometimes, we keep the empty, untitled folder because we've grown accustomed to
it being where it is; perhaps it is providing a unexplicable sense of comfort. There are also 
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those empty, untitled folders that we never re-discover; they are sitting in mysterious 
places on our operating system, simply existing.
 
The folder as a stream of bytes and the folder as our file holder represent what Harman 
considers to be the two primary types of knowledge: what an object is made of and its 
effects in the world. However, Harman would also argue that no object can be reduced 
"downward" to its constituent components or "upwards" to its effects in the world. In other 
words, the untitled folder is more than its stream of bytes and more than its use by humans
and computers. A description of the untitled folder from either of these two perspectives 
would not provide full knowledge on or access to the folder itself. The irreducible existence
of the empty, untitled folder is as mysterious as any object existing in the world and may 
seem even more so given how strange it is to even think of a folder or any digital object as 
existing. Yuk Hui echoes this sentiment by describing  the digital object as "highly 
enigmatic," "an object neither of experience nor of intuition."84
The mystery behind digital existence stems from the fact that digital objects from the 
"user's point of view" are abstractions.85 A digital file is virtual. The bits that compose a file 
are "brought together in real time" when the user engages with it and those bits are often 
derived from other files, which themselves may not be singular.86 Therefore, at "the 
interface between the user and the system," the stream of bytes that we think of as the 
smallest constituent units of the empty, untitled folder are brought together at the moment 
of interaction to form the impression of a unitary object that users can interact with as if the
folder "had properties similar to a corporeal file."87 In other words, our ordinary notion of 
the untitled folder is one that the computer creates for us every single point at which we 
engage with the folder. Is this virtual existence real? Is there any point in speculating the 
existence of an untitled folder outside our perception of it? We know that the software on 
our computer has been specifically designed to create the impression of a unitary 
container when the folder is in fact a composite object, composed of streams and bundles 
of binary code and of possibly other single and composite files. The folder therefore does 
84. Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects, Electronic Mediations 48, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016, xi.
85. Richard Harper, Siân Lindley, Eno Thereska, Richard Banks, Philip Gosset, Gavin Smyth, William Odom, 
and Eryn Whitworth, "What is a File?"ACM, 2013, 1132.
86. Harper et. al, “What is a File?,” 1129.
87. Ibid.
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not appear or function like a unitary folder without a human or programmable computer 
interfacing with it and, therefore, one might argue that the existence of the folder is 
dependent on the human mind. 
However, we can argue that all reality has some element of the virtual. A human being is 
composed of streams of atoms, bundles of molecules and interconnected organs, 
including our outer layer of skin. When we interact with other humans we do not perceive 
all the overlapping streams of atoms from which they are constituted. Instead our brains 
are designed to form a cohesive, unitary image of the human based on the outer layer of 
heterogeneous "bits" with which we are confronted.  Although we know that our perception
of the human as a unitary entity does not accurately reflect the multi-layered, dynamic 
interplay of all the constituent parts of the human, we still believe that the human exists. 
Moreover, other humans have an existence independent of our awareness of them. 
Similarly, although the representation of the untitled folder we are confronted with does not
capture the hidden layer of zeros and ones that form its underlying code, both the folder-
as-seen-by-the-user and its stream of bytes are connected to something that actually 
exists. As DeLanda notes, every object consists of an "associated possibility space" whose
points, "representing ordinary possibilities, are not mind-independent," but "the structure of
the space...does exist independently of our minds."88 In other words, we may not be able 
to know the nature of the untitled folder outside of our minds, but our perception of the 
untitled folder is constrained by a structure in space that does exist independent of our 
awareness. If I abandon my computer in a desert, the untitled folder on my home drive will 
exist in some way indefinitely. If I retrieve the unscathed computer from the desert I can 
interact once again with the untitled folder because some structure of space definitively 
associated with the folder persisted through its days in the desert.
  
As mentioned earlier, my intention, as an artist, is to foreground that autonomous 
existence of objects, that structure in space which persists regardless of our mind's 
content. For this reason, I have chosen specifically to present an empty, untitled folder as I
believe this appearance of emptiness facilitates speculation on the object's autonomous 
existence. The style of untitled_folder is informed by a strong compositional, literary, and 
artistic tradition of works that focus attention on what, at least initially, appears to be a void.
88. DeLanda and Harman, Rise of realism, 65.
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I have nicknamed these works "nothing pieces" and provide a self-curated list of some of 
them below. 
Table 1: Nothing Pieces
Artist  Work  Year
Larry Bell  Untitled  1967
George Brecht  Void Stone  1987
Mark Callahan  Internet Soul Portraits  2005
Bruno Munari  Little White Riding Hood  2004
Yves Klein  The Void  1958
Gabriel Orozco  Empty Shoe Box  1993
Ceal Floyer  Auto Focus  2002
George Brecht Two Elimination Events 1963
Marcel Duchamp  Air de Paris  1919
Martin Creed  Work No. 916  2008
Kazimir Malevich  White on White  1918
John Cage  4'33"  1952
Ansh Patel  Encore  2015
Eugen Gomringer silencio  1953
Tom Friedman 1000 Hours of Staring  1992-97
Peter Ablinger Weiss/Weisslich 25  1996
Joseph Beuys The Silence  1973
George Brecht Tea Event  1961
As mentioned in reference to Bolognini's Sealed Computers, the strong sense of a "void" 
we initially encounter in these works invites speculation on that which lies beyond our 
ordinary perception of the object. In this act of speculation and focused attention on the 
object, we notice that void is a form in itself, sketching the boundaries around a rich, 
autonomous existence. As Cage has remarked, “There is no such thing as an empty space
or an empty time. There is always something to see, something to hear. In fact, try as we 
may to make a silence, we cannot. Sounds occur whether intended or not."89 The empty, 
untitled folder, therefore, is similar to Cage's 4'33'' in that it directs attention to its own 
'sounds' and 'sights' waiting for us to 'hear' and 'see' it. This is echoed by Wolfgang 
89. Hannah Higgins, The Grid Book, MIT Press, 2009, 263.
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Staehle when he says, "I am interested in what happens when nothing happens." For 
Staehle and for artists in Table 1,  "nothing" is an ideal or a guiding star on the horizon. 
The actual outcome of reaching towards nothing is a minimization of the human mediation 
between object and spectator - a reduction in pre-determined, goal-oriented narratives and
alterations made to the object or to its natural context. Conceptual artist Douglas Huebler 
captures this sentiment when saying in relation to his practice that "the world is full of 
objects, more or less interesting," "I prefer, simply, to state the existence of things in terms 
of time and/or place."90
In a sense, the goal of "nothing pieces" is actually "nothing added." In the case of 
untitled_folder, what is normally added to a composition, a “narrative,” is replaced by an 
empty folder existing. It is not to say that the folder's performance of existence is not 
filtered through our anthropomorphic perceptual lens. Naturally, this is the case in every 
encounter with an object. The question is how do we perceive the folder's existence 
differently depending on the degree to which the artist mediates the encounter between 
spectator and folder? How does the encounter change when we attempt to add nothing? 
In untitled_folder, I have attempted to "add nothing" by presenting the empty, untitled 
folder unaltered, without instructions, without suggested symbolism, and, as mentioned 
earlier, by presenting the folder as an actual usable untitled folder in its ecological context -
that is, wherever it is normally found. I have carefully chosen just a few aesthetic cues to 
provide when presenting the work so as to keep attention directed to the folder as it exists 
"idiomatically." As mentioned in the previous section, my identity as an artist in association 
with my presentation of the untitled folder provides already plenty of aesthetic context. 
Perhaps, even more so, simply my act in presenting and sharing with the world an object 
that is normally considered to possess little to no value (even less value than a penny) 
facilitates aestheticization of the folder. This intensified aesthetic perspective may involve 
prolonged interest and attention directed towards the folder, and, in regards to an empty, 
untitled folder, any interest or attention given, even if just for a second, would be more than
what most people give the folder in a lifetime. It is this integration of subtle aesthetic cues 
in a largely everyday context that I believe has the potential of leading spectators to see 
the folder as if for the first time and to wonder (even if not quite consciously) "What is the 
untitled folder?" and "What it is like for the untitled folder to exist?"
90. Eldritch Priest, Boring Formless Nonsense, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, 49.
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jorge.png
Similarity connotates both sameness and difference.91
- Antoine Beuger 
This piece is an image resulting from the conversion of a JPG file to a PNG file. The 
context for this piece began when composer Mark So mailed a page of writing from his 
notebook to my friend Robert Blatt and me in 2017. Robert realized his "instance of Mark 
So's notebook" by creating 8 "transcriptions, at different times and places."92 Each 
transcription features a selection of Mark's words rewritten in ink and erased pencil and 
scattered across two double-sided sheets of paper and translucent vellum. I initially 
realized Mark's page by silently reading it to myself while at a concert. Like Robert, 
though, I also wanted to create some sort of transcription, but before I could get started, I 
lost the page. 
91. James Saunders and Antoine Beuger. “Antoine Beuger,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Experimental Music, 1 edition. Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009, 241.
92. Robert Blatt, “Robert Blatt | Transcripts (26 Iv 17 Los Angeles - 1 v from Notebook/Reading List by Mark 
So),” Accessed January 5, 2020. http://robertblatt.ricercata.org/pieces/Transcripts-mark.html.
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Figure 6: A screenshot showing an untitled folder on Tristan Murail's laptop. 
Murail, Tristan. “- « OpenMusic in my life » (mon expérience et pratique de la CAO)” Feb. 28, 2018. 
Video, 02:29:45. https://medias.ircam.fr/x8ec0a8
This year, I realized that I had a JPG image of the page that Mark had previously emailed 
to me. It is then that I thought of a machinic transcription of the page's image, one in which
the computer performs the transcription by converting the photograph of the page from 
JPG to PNG format. My interest in transcribing the JPG instead of the forms captured by 
the image was based on the idea that the JPG is an object in its own right, as opposed to 
simply a tool for visual representation, and that the JPG was itself a transcription of the 
original page. Therefore, although I was initially disappointed that the analogue page was 
lost, I decided to interpret Mark's photograph as a camera/human transcription of the 
page, an initiation of a transcription process that I could continue. 
I was reminded by G. Douglas Barret's Derivations series (2006-2010), in which software 
uses spectral and rhythmic analyses to transcribe a recording of a performance into a 
musical score for a subsequent performance. This "photocopy-of-a-photocopy" recursive 
process is repeated for each piece in the series, so that you have "a transcription of a 
recording of a performance of a transcription of a recording of a performance" and so on, 
with the chain of derivation lengthening after each subsequent piece.93  Through errors in 
the software's translation of recording to score and the performers' translation of score to 
performance, the pieces throughout the series evolve into something widely different from 
the original artifact. I was inspired by this recursive approach but was interested in 
transcription with minimal perceptible effects. I asked myself, "How can I create a 
transcription that on the face of it looks as if almost nothing has changed?" Converting 
Mark So's original image from JPG to PNG format was the solution I chose. This approach
to transcription raises questions as to the meaning of transcription. Typically, transcription 
is defined either as "a copy," as in written words from a speech, or "translation," in the 
sense of turning something from one language into another language or from one set of 
symbols into another.94
93. David Pocknee, “Better Know A Weisslich: G Douglas Barrett,” WEISSLICH (blog), April 22, 2016, https://
weisslich.com/2016/04/22/better-know-a-weisslich-g-douglas-barrett/. ; Barrett, G. Douglas. “Derivation XIII 
b.” Musical Score, 2009. https://gdouglasbarrett.com/music/derivation_XIII_b/Derivation_XIII_B.pdf.
94. “Definition of TRANSLATE.” Accessed January 6, 2020. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/translate. 
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Certainly, by comparing the images, the eye would be tempted to conclude that this 
transcription functions as a copy. However, a comparison of the code for the JPG and
PNG files points to their differences and to the artefacts of translation.  Below is the 
first ten lines of a hexadecimal representation of the binary code for the JPG and the 
PNG files. This type of output, known as a hex dump, is a sort of shorthand for binary
code in that each hexadecimal digit represents four bits of data. Therefore, the 
differences in the lines of code for the JPG versus PNG represent differences in the 
binary code of the files, what can be considered the file’s lowest-level code:
jorge.JPG:
0000000 d8ff e0ff 1000 464a 4649 0100 0101 4800 
0000010 4800 0000 e1ff fc9f 7845 6669 0000 4949 
0000020 002a 0008 0000 000c 010f 0002 0009 0000 
0000030 009e 0000 0110 0002 000e 0000 00a8 0000 
0000040 0112 0003 0001 0000 0006 0000 011a 0005 
0000050 0001 0000 00b6 0000 011b 0005 0001 0000 
0000060 00be 0000 0128 0003 0001 0000 0002 0000 
0000070 0131 0002 0025 0000 00c6 0000 0132 0002 
0000080 0014 0000 00ec 0000 0213 0003 0001 0000 
0000090 0002 0000 8298 0002 0005 0000 0100 0000
jorge.png:
0000000 5089 474e 0a0d 0a1a 0000 0d00 4849 5244 
0000010 0000 900c 0000 c010 0208 0000 0900 736e 
0000020 0011 0000 6704 4d41 0041 b100 0b8f 61fc 
0000030 0005 0000 6320 5248 004d 7a00 0026 8000 
0000040 0084 fa00 0000 8000 00e8 7500 0030 ea00 
0000050 0060 3a00 0098 1700 9c70 51ba 003c 0000 
0000060 6206 474b 0044 00ff 00ff a0ff a7bd 0093 
0000070 0000 7009 5948 0073 0b00 0012 0b00 0112 
0000080 ddd2 fc7e 0000 0700 4974 454d e307 050b 
0000090 2e0d 5425 4cd1 0097 0000 6f01 4e72 0654
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As can be seen, the code of the JPG and PNG files are quite different. We now have two 
phenomenological accounts of the JPG and PNG files: one in the form of visual images 
representing what the camera originally captured and the other in the form of binary code 
that is read by the computer to produce the images in pixels. Clearly, our perception of the 
image does not provide us with full knowledge on the JPG versus PNG as we would 
probably not be able to distinguish between their images without other information, such 
as their file extension names. However, treating a collection of 0s and 1s as the 
"foundation of being" for the JPG and the PNG is just as reductionistic as understanding 
these digital objects exclusively by their "user-level” appearance as photographs.95 This is 
the point that philosopher Yuk Hui makes when he says that bits can be thought of as "the 
atomic representation" of data, but that just as the world cannot be fully understood in 
terms of atoms, neither can data be fully understood in terms of bits.96 In fact, Hui's point is
that no amount of searching downwards into the digital object will ever uncover its 
"essence:"
Digital objects appear to human users as colourful and visible beings. At the level of
programming they are text files; further down the operating system they are binary 
codes; finally, at the level of circuit boards they are nothing but signals generated by
the values of voltage and the operation of logic gates... Searching downward we 
may end up with the mediation of silicon and metal. And finally we could go into 
particles and fields. But this kind of reductionism doesn’t tell us much about the 
world.97
The Buddhist allegory reminds us that while the finger points to the moon, the finger is not 
the moon. The hex dump representing the PNG's binary code is like the finger pointing to 
the moon. The binary code points to the PNG, but it is not the PNG. Likewise, the image 
points to the PNG, but it is not the PNG. If the finger-pointing-to-the-moon analogy seems 
to lose its intuitive appeal when replaced with digital objects, you are not alone. Even  
those well-informed in computer science grapple with the seemingly strange concept of 
data just existing. In an interview with Hui, the Founding Director of The Institute of 





Network Cultures, Geert Lovink, implied that such a notion might appear to some as 
"intolerable,"
You have said that 'the digital is the capacity to process data.'... This 'dynamic' 
approach presumes that there is also a static view, of zeros and ones, in which 
the digital merely is. Is it an intolerable thought that data can just exist, without 
any context—data as such?98
Hui's response is essentially "yes." He explains by pointing out that beyond static and 
dynamic views of data, there are "different orders of magnitude" of a digital object. The 0 
and 1 level is one order of magnitude, while the object the you the user can click, drag, 
and delete is another order of magnitude. Most importantly, Hui argues that "each of these 
orders of magnitude can be seen as a reality in itself."99 The colorful, interactive objects, 
the text-files, the stream of bytes, the signals generated by the circuit board, the mediation 
of silicon and metal, and the interaction of particles and fields are all real. They exist 
regardless of whether humans are aware of them of not. 
In order to tolerate the idea of data "just existing," it should be re-iterated that mind-
independence is not independence from the existence of the mind. The existence of digital
objects are highly dependent on the existence of human minds as is evidenced by our 
ability to "rewrite the whole code of a digital object, change its identity, and delete it in a 
second."100 As DeLanda reminds us, mind-independence signifies "independence from the
content of our minds," not from the existence of our minds.101 The piece jorge.png 
resonates with Harman and DeLanda's realism in that it creates a cognitive dissonance 
between different phenomenological perspectives of the same object, rendering the 
phenomenological incapable of providing a cohesive account of the objects at hand: when 
comparing the files jorge.jpg and jorge.png, the images appear the same while the data 
that underlies the images does not. We are left with a sense that the phenomenological 
accounts, neither exclusively nor together, provide an exhaustive account of the actual 




101. DeLanda and Harman, Rise of realism, 39.
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although I believe the piece, by focusing on the PNG-status of the object, invites such 
speculation. As Hui argues, phenomenologists have been "eager to find the structure of 
consciousness that would allow it to know the object, but there is among them less 
investigation into the object’s own existence, and how its existence conditions the process 
of knowing and being itself."102
For jorge.png, I have used methods similar to the untitled_folder in order to foreground the 
PNG's own existence, the "intolerable" notion of data "just existing." I have used a 
common, found, and simple object and intend on presenting it in its ecological context. I 
will provide a digital download of the PNG on my account on archive.org with 
accompanying text stating that this is a PNG photograph converted from a JPG taken by 
composer Mark So. The context is ecological in the sense that the file appears and 
functions like an ordinary image file, as something that can easily be downloaded within 
the comfort of one's home on one's personal device with no instructions for what to do with
the photo other than look at it. At the same time, the context is aestheticized in that I have 
associated myself as an artist with the piece, the photographer Mark So is a composer as 
well, and I have mysteriously implied that there is some value to converting the JPG to 
PNG. 
  







The piece for web browser is any web browser with javascript disabled. JavaScript is the 
main programming language used in web browsers. One of the main reasons it was 
integrated into the web in the 1990s was to make websites more interactive, transforming 
them from archival storage sites to programs capable of satisfying countless social 
functions in society. The issue with javascript used in the web now is that most of it is 
proprietary; it is hidden from users and it is used by companies, including Facebook, 
Google, and others, to capture personal information and browsing behaviors - an activity 
known as life-mining or data-mining. This has led Richard Stallman, director of the Free 
Software Foundation, to advise users to disable proprietary javascript in web browsers, a 
task that every user can accomplish rather easily but one that most users don't even know 
about. 
Richard Stallman recounts some of the dangers of javascript in his article “The Javascript 
Trap”:
JavaScript ... was once used for minor frills in web pages, such as cute but 
inessential navigation and display features. It was acceptable to consider these 
as mere extensions of HTML markup, rather than as true software, and 
disregard the issue.
Some sites still use JavaScript that way, but many use it for major programs 
that do large jobs. For instance, Google Docs tries to install into your browser a 
JavaScript program which measures half a megabyte, in a compacted form that 
we could call Obfuscript. This compacted form is made from the source code, 
by deleting the extra spaces that make the code readable and the explanatory 
remarks that make it comprehensible, and replacing each meaningful name in 
the code with an arbitrary short name so we can't tell what it is supposed to 
mean.103
 
Javascript code as it is used in the browser, then, is intentionally made unreadable. 
Consequently, companies and "cyber criminals" alike are capable of browser attacks with 
countless documented examples of “drive-by-downloads, pop-up ads, and phishing 
103. Richard Stallman, “The Javascript Trap,” Accessed January 5, 2020. 
https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/javascript-trap.en.html.
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attacks.”104 Disabling javascript, therefore, is a much safer way of browsing the web. 
However, as the screenshots below demonstrate, disabling javascript interferes 
significantly with the function and usability of major websites.
104. Samuel Ndichu, Sangwook Kim, Seiichi Ozawa, Takeshi Misu, and Kazuo Makishima, “A Machine 
Learning Approach to Detection of JavaScript-Based Attacks Using AST Features and Paragraph Vectors,” 
Applied Soft Computing 84 (November 2019): 1. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asoc.2019.105721.
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Figure 9: YouTube.com with javascript enabled
Figure 10: YouTube.com with javascript disabled
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Figure 11: world.taobao.com with javascript enabled
Figure 12: world.taobao.com with javascript disabled
With javascript disabled, Youtube becomes a ghost town with empty unclickable video 
frames, Amazon appears similar initially but breaks at the point that you actually try to 
purchase an item, and Twitter redirects you automatically to a page asking you to enable 
javascript, preventing you from even entering the app. Richard Stallman advises users to 
disable proprietary javascript but goes through great lengths himself to avoid it in his daily 
life, going out of his way to pay in cash for several routine online transactions. For most 
people whose work is not engulfed in free software activism, the sacrifice of disabling 
javascript is too high. 
From the aesthetic perspective, though, disabling javascript is appreciated precisely for its 
manner of rendering websites quasi- or non-functional. It is another means of arriving at 
the empty graphical user interfaces found in Mark Callahan’s Internet Soul Portraits. In for 
web browser, what is foregrounded is the web browser performing its existence, one that 
we normally take for granted. Kenneth Goldsmith reiterates this point, comparing our use 
of the browser to breathing. 
When we use an apparatus extensively, it becomes invisible, as we become 
completely subsumed by content....we still take the apparatus for granted, the 
way we might take breathing or our body’s circulatory system for granted...105
In this sense, the breaking of the web allows us to see the vehicle of content, the browser 
itself. This notion of an object becoming visible upon breaking was famously developed by 
Heiddeger within his tool-analysis in Being and Time (1927). Harman has adopted this 
tool-analysis in his philosophy of Object-oriented Ontology and popularized a particular 
interpretation of it. According to Harman, Heidegger showed that "for the most part, 
dealing with things consciously is a relatively rare and derivative scenario. More common 
is the experience of simply taking things for granted, not noticing them until they go 
wrong."106 To demonstrate this point, Heidegger uses the example of a hammer as a tool 
that we normally do not notice "until it fails to function and is suddenly exposed to our 
conscious gaze."107 It is only when the hammer breaks that we see it. This is the case with 
the browser, as well, but what results when the browser breaks may be a bit stranger as 
105. Goldsmith, Wasting Time, 61-62.
106. Harman, A new theory, 152.
107. Ibid, 153.
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the browser, unlike the hammer, consists of many virtual layers that can appear, disappear,
and meld into one another instantaneously. Imagine a hammer that at the moment of 
breaking immediately transforms its whole constitution into something else, this is the 
virtual hammer. It is not only the web browser itself that becomes visible upon breaking, 
but its multilayered complexity. This multi-layeredness is captured by Goldsmith when he 
likens the web to conscious and unconscious domains.
 We could say that the mechanics that runs the web— from the code to the server 
farms—are the web’s subconscious, while the software—the graphical user 
interface and all the activities that happen there, on the surface—is the web’s 
consciousness. The unconscious, which is pure apparatus, is all hung on a grid, 
starting with binary code, moving to the pixel, and resulting in GUIs (graphical user 
interfaces).108 
By disabling javascript, we can think of ourselves entering a zone between the web's 
consciousness (its user interface) and the web's subconsciousness (its code). In this 
liminal zone, that aspect of the web browser that is likely to become most apparent is its 
grid-like structure. As Goldsmith says, "All of the image archiving interfaces— Pinterest, 
Flickr, Instagram, Google Images—are gridded, from the rectangular format of the images 
to the lattices on which they are hung. While the images themselves may proffer organic 
subject matter, the interface and apparatus is entirely industrial."109
The disabled-javascript browser, then, reveals different layers of the site's gridded, 
industrial structure. Some of gridded layers are visible without javascript disabled such as 
the industrial, block-like display of a normally functioning Youtube site, but given our focus 
on the content of the site we are normally blind to the display  - blind to the performance of
the browser. By disabling javascript, therefore, one may achieve the sense of seeing the 
browser as if for the first time. 
Just as was argued for untitled_folder and jorge.png, though, this “seeing for the first time” 
does not mean that the autonomous existence of the web browser "becomes nakedly 
present before us," but that the phenomenological form of the web browser becomes 
108. Goldsmith, Wasting Time, 61-62.
109. Ibid.
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consciously visible - a first step towards speculating on what the web browser is and how it
performs its autonomous existence.110
The piece itself is realized by all the javascript-disabled web browsers existing in the world 
now and the in future. There is no score for the piece, but there are ways to document it. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I have chosen to take screenshots of popular homepages 
with javascript disabled as a type of sampling or collecting of artifacts. As there is no 
score, there is also no specified way to engage with the browser. However, I envision one 
realizing the piece by casually browsing the web as they would normally, discovering the 
newness of a web that does not function solely for human ends. I imagine this realm to be 
an exciting new frontier in which browser and user become more equal players.
series of long-range polyrhythms 
five against three hundred and thirty-three & seventeen against one 
thousand four hundred and thirty-three 
The following work is a series of long-range polyrhythms that are so stretched out in time 
as to escape human perception. I will discuss two pieces within the series: five against 
three-hundred and thirty-three and seventeen against one-thousand four-hundred and 
thirty-three. The pieces are simply the polyrhythms in the title and are realized not only by 
performers who intentionally carry out the polyrhythms, but by objects and events in the 
world juxaposed against each other. This topic of interpretation will be returned to shortly. 
For now, I would like to briefly outline three influences for the work: (1) Elliot Carter's long-
range polyrhythms, (2) Timothy Morton's hyperobjects, and (3) Tom Johnson's found 
music. 
Beginning with Night Fantasies for piano (1980), Elliott Carter structured entire 
compositions based on long-range polyrhythms. In Night Fantasies, the underlying 
rhythmic skeleton of this 20 minute piece is a polyrhythm of 216 against 175.111 Above this 
macro structure are different micro layers of rhythm and melody. Given the extended 
110. Harman, A new theory, 153.
111 . John F. Link, "Long-range polyrhythms in Elliott Carter's recent music," PhD diss., City University of 
New York, 1994.
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duration of this polyrhythm and the use of musical layering, it is not possible to hear the 
polyrhythm as such nor is it the point of the piece. The long-range polyrhythm is being 
used principally as a structural, pre-compositional device. 
My pieces are similar to Night Fantasies in the sense that the long-range polyrhythms are 
too long to be perceived, but they differ in that the form of the pieces are encapsulated in 
the polyrhythms themselves, with no additional musical layers. The form of the piece is the
content and vice versa. In this work, we are confronted simply with a proportional 
relationship between the repetitive cycle of one object juxtaposed against another. In order
to exaggerate the imperceptibility of the polyrhythms I have specifically chosen values far 
apart from each other. There are only five events that occur within three-hundred and 
thirty-three. An event repeating itself three-hundred and thirty-three times is already 
outside the realm of our human perceptibility. You do not really know what it sounds like for
an event to repeat 333 times, as evidenced by the fact that if that event was repeated 311 
times instead you would probably not be able to tell the difference. After a certain point, we
loose track of time and are unable to hold the object in our mind's eye. If you then consider
that a value as small as 5 is spread out in the span of 333, the overall event becomes 
even less discernible. After the first iteration of the five events, so much time passes that 
once the second iteration occurs it comes as a sort of nostalgic surprise, a moment of "Oh 
ya, I almost forgot about that thing happening 5 times." We are stuck in the flexible yet 
small frame of the human present, while the polyrhythm marches on in an extended 
present. 
Timothy Morton would consider this polyrhythm to be a "hyperobject," since it is 'hyper' 
relative to our present sense of time. Morton's hyperobject is, in fact, anything "massively 
distributed in time and space relative" to some other entity.112 Below, Morton provides 
examples of hyperobjects relative to humans.   
A hyperobject could be a black hole. A hyperobject could be the Lago
Agrio oil field in Ecuador, or the Florida Everglades. A hyperobject could
be the biosphere, or the Solar System. A hyperobject could be the sum
total of all the nuclear materials on Earth; or just the plutonium, or the
uranium. A hyperobject could be the very long-lasting product of direct
human manufacture, such as Styrofoam or plastic bags, or the sum of all
112. Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World, Minneapolis: 
University Of Minnesota Press, 2013, 1.
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the whirring machinery of capitalism. Hyperobjects, then, are “hyper” in
relation to some other entity, whether they are directly manufactured by
humans or not.113
This list demonstrates that some hyperobjects are massive primarily in time, others in 
space, and yet others in both time and space. Styrofoam, for instance, occupies an 
incredulous amount of space when considering all styrofoam on Earth and its infinite uses. 
At the same time, one styrofoam cup  "will take about five hundred years to biodegrade," 
occupying an equally incredulous amount of time.114 Given the open instrumentation of 
these pieces and the fact they can be "found" in the world, these polyrhythms have the 
potential to be hyperobjects in space and time. 
The idea of finding the polyrhythm in the world is inspired in part by Tom Johnson's notion 
of found music. An example would be Johnson's Chord Catalogue, which consists of "all 
the chords possible in one octave, played one after the other.”115 Johnson mentions that 
this was the first composition he produced that he hesitated to call his own. Later, he 
unabashedly, embraced the process of finding music, saying "I too like to find music that 
exists outside myself, rather than to compose something that is inside myself".116 Johnson 
finds music most often in mathematical models, including "a logical sequence of number, 
or a set of permutations, or Pascal's triangle, or a logical sequence of geometric turns, or 
with the paper-folding formula."117 This is similar to my process, given that I am also finding
mathematical models, although mine are simply ratios. There are, though, an infinite 
number of ways of finding a model or form. 
For five against three-hundred and thirty-three, I chose the numbers intuitively and 
organized performances of the polyrhythm, but I also found and imagined the polyrhythm 
as it could exist in the world. Here is a list of realizations, some of which were organized 
and others which were "found."
113. Morton, Hyperobjects, 1.
114. Ibid, 140.
115. Tom Johnson, "I Want to Find the Music, Not to Compose It," self-published, n.d., 3-4.




• 5 cracked eggs against 333 repeated mbira tones (realized by Federico Pozzer and
Carla Cao)
• 5 on/off electric fan switches against 333 mbira tones (realized by David Zed and 
Carla Cao)
• 5 cell phone notifications against 333 cell phone notifications (ongoing realization as
of this writing by Samuel Howard)
• 5 string harmonics/multiphonics against 333 trampoline jumps  
• 5 unknown events against 333 traffic light changes 
• 5 read words against 333 freely uttered words
• 5 pictures taken of a ukulele player against 333 chords strummed by the ukulele 
player.   
In addition to 5 against 333, my other long-range polyrhythm, seventeen against one-
thousand four-hundred and thirty-three, might be considered even more "found" in that not 
only do I encourage "found realizations" of the polyrhythm but the values for the 
polyrhythm themselves were "found." In this case, the value 1433 is the number of words 
in Donald Trump's inaugural speech while 17 represents the year he gave the inaugural 
address. One possible realization for this polyrhythm is to read all the words of Donald 
Trump's inaugural address in alphabetical order118 against 17 events, noises, or tones. At 
the same time, this polyrhythm can be realized in ways that have nothing to do with the 
Trump's inaugural address. 
The point is that these polyrhythms can be realized intentionally and that at the same time 
they are already existing everywhere whether we are aware of it or not. As we speak there 
are five events happening within the space of three-hundred and thirty-three. It is simply 
up to us to notice these juxtaposed events, to begin speculating the infinite number of 5-
against-333s that are occurring within all time scales possible. Selective attention is 
necessary to imagine or find these polyrhythms, but selective attention does not create the
polyrhythm. The polyrhythm exists regardless of whether we perceive it or not. This 
harkens back to the old question of whether the tree falling in the woods makes a sound 
even if no one is around to hear it. My answer would be yes. However, I understand that 
given the human-centered definition of rhythm, the term polyrhythm is counterintuitive 
118. https://archive.org/details/1433words
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when speculating on its existence outside human perception. If we replace the term 
polyrhythm with "whatever happens when x is repeated proportionally in the space of y," 
we allow for a more extended notion of polyrhythm and perhaps one that is less 
anthropocentric. Johnson alludes to the potential of found music to de-center the human 
when he says, "Is this not a search to find a kind of music that existed, or could have 
existed, before the advent of human beings on the earth?".119
119. Johnson, "I want to find the music," 3.
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Figure 13: Excerpt of seventeen against one thousand four hundred and thirty-three 
showing events 2/17:1433, 3/17:1433, and 4/17:1433.
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have presented works that are intended to foreground objects performing 
their own existence, supporting the notion of existence as performance. Central to my 
methodology is the minimalism of content and aesthetic context. This includes the use of 
common, found, and simple objects with little to no alterations and the presentation of 
these objects in their ecological context - where they are mostly likely to be found and 
doing what they most often do. For untitled_folder and jorge.png, the respective objects 
are presented as downloads online with no further instructions and are likely to be 
downloaded by people in a domestic setting or somewhere outside the institutionalized art 
context. The pieces for web browser and the long-range polyrhythms feature objects 
existing in the world already and I have simply chosen to present certain artifacts of their 
existence in the form of screenshots and graphical representations. 
However, I do incorporate aesthetic cues into the ecological context to increase conscious 
engagement of our otherwise spontaneous aesthetic perception of everyday objects. 
Based on psychological literature and aesthetic theory, I have reason to believe that 
aesthetic perspective, at least as it is exercised in Western industrialized culture, is likely 
to be accompanied by prolonged attention and contemplation on the object existing, in 
addition to a greater openness towards the object as an end-in-itself as opposed to simply 
a tool. The function of the ecological context, then, is to counterbalance the distancing, 
distorting effect of aesthetic perception with a focus on the everyday object, the object as it
exists "at home," so to speak. 
I argue that the methodology underlying my work facilitates the sense of seeing the object 
as if for the first time and the speculation of the autonomous existence of objects - objects 
existing independent of the content of our minds. This speculation may spark questions 
regarding the objects in the pieces, such as "What does it mean for the untitled folder to 
exist?," "What is like for the PNG to be itself as opposed to being a JPG?,"What is a web 
browser, really?," and "How does a polyrhythm exist when it extends outside the limits of 
human perception?" In regards to the digital pieces, the notion of digital objects as 
virtualized tools is strongly ingrained, making the idea of data "simply existing" particularly 
strange. Therefore, an additional objective of mine has been to point to the 
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multidimensionality of digital objects and their status as irreducible objects whose 
existence or know-ability is inexhausted by our use or phenomenological account of them. 
I have referred to this objective as daylighting the digital as a comparison to ecological 
daylighting -  the act of removing concrete and pavement to reveal rivers underneath our 
feet that have been flowing outside of our awareness. 
My hope is that upon speculation on the object's autonomous existence, not only will the 
performative aspect of an object's existence be highlighted (e.g. an object dynamically 
existing as opposed to an object's static existence) but also that one's engagement with 
the object will be ongoing. Cultural theorist Sianne Ngai links the ongoing nature of 
aesthetic experience with works belonging to the aesthetic category of "interesting." Ngai 
associates the 'merely interesting' conceptual art of the 1960s with the artists' compulsive 
desire to "exchange information".120 That along with an increasingly intimate link between 
the interesting and "a kind of everydayness" led to an explosion of art from the 20th 
century that appeared to communicate information of the most mundane type, like 
Kenneth Goldsmith's Weather (2005), which "transcribes a year's worth of daily weather 
reports" from a New York radio station.121 According to Ngai, in regards to everyday 
conceptual art, in which 'what you see is what you see,' aesthetic perception toggles 
between the boring and the interesting.122 It can be said that the untitled folder, the PNG, 
the web browser, and the long-range polyrhythms all have an element of the interesting 
and boring or an element of "toggling between the boring and the interesting".123 While this 
type of art may not inspire the feeling of sublime , "a kind of thunderbolt" or an 
instantaneous, sudden  "once-and-for-allness," interesting/boring art, as Ngai argues, 
inspires an "extended time frame" with the object.124 Ngai says, "What we find interesting is
typically something we compulsively come back to, as if to verify to ourselves that it is still 
interesting and thus potentially to find it interesting again".125  This leads to "a second and 
120. Sianne Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting, Cambridge, Massachusetts London, 
England: Harvard University Press, 2015, 13.
121. Marjorie Perloff, Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century, Chicago, Ill: University 
of Chicago Press, 2012, 147.





possibly third, fourth, or nth+1 encounter" with the interesting.126  Ngai suggests that our 
recursive returning to the object is based on a 'feeling of incompleteness' that is not 
exhausted by any number of encounters with it.127 
I consider this sense of incompleteness to be the result of our inability to fully know or 
access the object. We run headlong against the limits of our perception when we reach 
towards the objects as it is. At the same time, our engagement with the object is not in 
vain. Through ongoing engagement with the object we are likely to gain greater knowledge
and familiarity with the object, as well as a greater sense of intimacy. Perhaps, most 
importantly from my perspective, though, is that we are likely to be more and more 
impressed by the irreducible mystery of the object. As Aristotle's axiom goes, "the more 
you know, the more you realize you don't know." If there is any goal of aesthetic 
experience that I would prioritize it would be a confrontation with the mystery of an object 
as it exists in the world. The context of my pieces have been designed to promote this 
sense of mystery, one that inspires a return to the object and speculation on the nature of 
its existence. 
I would like to conclude this thesis with two points to keep in mind. One is that, although I 
have made efforts to facilitate a particular experience and interpretation of my work, I 
understand that my mediation as an artist between the object and the spectator is in no 
way definitive enough to steer away alternative interpretations. I am allowing both the 
objects and the spectators a great deal of freedom in how they interpret the works and 
even whether they interpret them aesthetically or not. As mentioned from the onset, I have 
embraced the notion of a context that does not irreversibly transform an object into art, but 
that rather allows for a continually reversible perception of an object as more art-like or 
less art-like. In other words, I recognize that the perception of my pieces, at any one given 
moment, are likely to lie on a spectrum between what we can consider as idealized "art" 
and "non-art" (or "everyday") poles of perception. Given this freedom, a spectator could 
very well completely anthropomorphize the untitled folder and exclusively perceive it as as 
symbol for the human, epidemic sense of meaninglessness haunting the 21st century. This




autonomously existing in the world. Again, as Francisco Lopez said in relation to sound, 
"As soon as the call is in the air, it doesn't belong to the frog that produced it anymore".128 
I believe that whether I blatantly infuse my intentions within my art or avoid leaving any 
traces of myself as the artist, the object and its reception does not belong to me either 
way. Therefore, beyond my desired interpretation of these pieces as objects existing 
autonomously, I value the freedom with which the objects can exist as they normally would
and the freedom with which spectators can choose how they engage and perceive the 
pieces, with only enough aesthetic cues to serve as an open invitation for an aestheticized 
perspective of the objects. 
Lastly, I would like to consider what initially appears to be a paradoxical relationship 
between my work and the defining principles of Conceptual Art. Paul Mann echoes a 
common rhetoric when he says that in conceptual art 'the art object as such need 
not...even exist; only its representation needs to circulate. A description will suffice: that is 
the lesson of conceptual art’ 129 If this "lesson" is taken at face value, it appears that the 
lesson of my work is the complete opposite: the concept of my work is precisely that the 
object needs to exist and that its representation or description will not suffice. The paradox
is that my work is in the style of Conceptual Art, yet, in my work, the concept behind the 
'art object' is not a sufficient replacement for the object because the concept is precisely 
that the object exists outside of any concept of it and that no concept can provide an 
exhaustive account of the object's existence. Therefore, while conceptual artists may 
embrace the notion that "a description will suffice," I insist that only the existence of the 
objects themselves will suffice. We don't fully know how the objects exist within or outside 
our phenomenological perception, which might lead us to speculate on this subject. 
However, this speculation is not the work itself. My work is the objects existing, regardless 
of how they are perceived and whether or not they are perceived as art. This is not to say 
that the concept of objects existing autonomously is not important, but only that the 
concept of objects existing is not objects existing. Again, the finger points to the moon, but 
the finger is not the moon. 
128. Lopez, "Environmental Sound Matter."
129. Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories, 13.
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Appendix: Source Code for untitled_folder
Mcron Script
;; This code repeatedly copies an untitled folder to a random 
;; directory on a user’s file system once every minute.
(job '(next-minute) "sudo cp -v untitled_folder `find / -type d 2>/dev/null \




# This code generates a hexdump of the untitled_folder existing on the ext2 
# and ext4 filesystem followed by a diff of the two hexdumps.
dd if=/dev/zero of=testfs bs=1 count=100000
mkfs.ext2 testfs
hexdump testfs > testfs-dump-01
mkdir testfs-dir
sudo mount ./testfs testfs-dir/
sudo mkdir testfs-dir/untitled_folder
sync
hexdump testfs > testfs-dump-02
diff testfs-dump-01 testfs-dump-02
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